B. Equitable Subrogation Principles
Copeland also asserts the district court erred in refusing to apply equitable subrogation principles to reduce or eliminate SRS’ share of the settlement proceeds. Copeland argues that under equitable subrogation principles, namely the "made whole" rule, SRS is entitled to recover only after Copeland is fully compensated for her loss. Copeland asserts that she was not fully compensated by the $250,000 settlement because her total alleged damages exceeded $6.4 million, leaving SRS "entitled to nothing from this settlement."[1] Alternatively, Copeland asserts that SRS' "recovery must be prorated to allow subrogation on a proportional basis of damages to recovery." Copeland specifically argues that because the settlement represents only 3.886% of her total alleged damages, SRS should recover at most only 3.886% of the medical expenses it paid, less its share of litigation expenses and attorney fees. In rejecting Copeland’s arguments for application of general equitable subrogation principles, the district court
- ↑ We note that the parties are not in accord as to the amount of Copeland’s total damages. At the hearing to approve the settlement and apportion the proceeds, Copeland’s mother testified that Copeland’s total damages exceeded $6 million and testified that the total damage figure had been derived in part from a report prepared by an individual “with expertise in rehabilitation.” Toyota’s attorney objected to this testimony except insofar as the evidence of damages was offered solely to assist the district court in determining whether the settlement was just and reasonable. The district court did not make any findings as to Copeland’s damages. Because our decision in this case is not dependent on the amount of Copeland’s total damages, we need not determine the accuracy of Copeland’s figure.
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