Page:Cruz v. Arizona (2023).pdf/16

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Cite as: 598 U. S. ____ (2023)

13

Opinion of the Court

P. 3d, at 1178).^[1]

Finally, the dissent attempts to draw a parallel between Rule 32.1(g) and certain procedural rules governing federal prisoners seeking to file delayed or successive §2255 motions. See 28 U. S. C. §§2255(f), (h). The parallel breaks down, however, because the rules are different. Unlike §2255(h)(2), which requires “a new rule of [federal] constitutional law,” and §2255(f)(3), which requires a right “newly recognized by the [U. S.] Supreme Court,” the relevant portion of Arizona’s Rule 32.1(g) simply requires “a significant change in the law.” As the Arizona Supreme Court has repeatedly interpreted that Rule, Lynch should qualify because it overruled binding Arizona precedent, creating a clear break from the past in Arizona courts. The Arizona Supreme Court’s contrary decision was unprecedented and unforeseeable. Only violations of state rules that are “ ‘firmly established and regularly followed’ … will be adequate to foreclose review of a federal claim.” Lee, 534 U. S., at 376. That standard is not met here.

↑ The Arizona Supreme Court claims it was acting consistently with its Shrum decision in this case. 251 Ariz., at 207, 487 P. 3d, at 995. That assertion does not stand up under inspection. In Shrum, the Arizona Supreme Court held that an Arizona decision did not constitute a “significant change in the law” because it “did not change any interpretation of Arizona constitutional law … and no precedent was overruled, all of which meant ‘the law remained precisely the same.’ ” 251 Ariz., at 207, 487 P. 3d, at 995 (quoting Shrum, 220 Ariz., at 119, 203 P. 3d, at 1179). In this case, the court reasoned it was acting consistently with Shrum because Lynch “did not change any interpretation of federal constitutional law … and no Supreme Court precedent was overruled or modified.” 251 Ariz., at 207, 487 P. 3d, at 995. The language used, however, reveals the inconsistency. While in Shrum the Arizona Supreme Court looked for a change in Arizona law, including whether any “precedent was overruled,” in this case the court instead asked only whether federal law had changed or whether federal “Supreme Court precedent was overruled.” No precedent of the Supreme Court of the United States was overruled, but precedent of the Arizona Supreme Court certainly was. Under the Arizona Supreme Court’s ordinary approach, then, there was a “significant change in the law.”

[1] The Arizona Supreme Court claims it was acting consistently with its Shrum decision in this case. 251 Ariz., at 207, 487 P. 3d, at 995. That assertion does not stand up under inspection. In Shrum, the Arizona Supreme Court held that an Arizona decision did not constitute a “significant change in the law” because it “did not change any interpretation of Arizona constitutional law … and no precedent was overruled, all of which meant ‘the law remained precisely the same.’ ” 251 Ariz., at 207, 487 P. 3d, at 995 (quoting Shrum, 220 Ariz., at 119, 203 P. 3d, at 1179). In this case, the court reasoned it was acting consistently with Shrum because Lynch “did not change any interpretation of federal constitutional law … and no Supreme Court precedent was overruled or modified.” 251 Ariz., at 207, 487 P. 3d, at 995. The language used, however, reveals the inconsistency. While in Shrum the Arizona Supreme Court looked for a change in Arizona law, including whether any “precedent was overruled,” in this case the court instead asked only whether federal law had changed or whether federal “Supreme Court precedent was overruled.” No precedent of the Supreme Court of the United States was overruled, but precedent of the Arizona Supreme Court certainly was. Under the Arizona Supreme Court’s ordinary approach, then, there was a “significant change in the law.”

[1]