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bf Ground they poffefs is but narrow ; and there is room either to extend 'em vaftly, or to lay Out new ones. They mew like the Cyclades at a diftance : Apparent rari nanies in Gurgite vafto.
THEY were divided, or canton'd out by their Jfirft Dii'coverers, into a number of Provinces, under di- ftinct Names ; and have thus remain'd for time immemorial, with little Alteration. And yet this Diftributiori of the Land of Science, like that of the Face of the Earth or Heavens, is wholly arbitrary and occa- sional ; and mi^ht eafily be broke thro', and alter'd, and perhaps not without advantage. Had not Alexander and C/zfiir liv'd, the Divifion of the Globe had doubtlefs been very different from what we now find it ; and the Cafe would have been the fame with the World of Learning, had no fuch Perfon been born as Arijlule. The firft Divifions of Knowledge were as fcanty and ill concerted as thofe of the firft Geographers ; and for the like Reafon : And tho future Columbia's and Baca's, by opening new Tracts, have carried our Knowledge a oreat way further •, yet the Regard we bear to the antient Adventurers, and the eftablifhed Diyifion; has made us take up with it, under all its Inconveniencies, and ftrain and ftretch things, to make our Difcoveries quadrate thereto. I do not know whether it might not be more for the general Intereft of Learning, to have all the Inclofures and Partitions thrown down, and the whole laid in common again, under one undif- tinmrilh'd Name. Our Inquiries, in fuch cafe, would not be confin'd to fo narrow a Channel ; but we mould be°led to explore, and purfue many a rich Mine and Vein, now doom'd to lie neglected, becaufe out or the
ART and Science are indeed two Words of familiar Ufe, and great importance ; but, I doubt little un- derftood. The Philofophers have long labour'd to explain and afcertain their Notion and Difference ; but all their Explanation amounts to little more than the fubftituting one obfcure Notion for another. Their At- tempts ufually terminate in fome barren Definition, which rather cafts Obfcurity than Light on the Subject Nor is the Reafon far to feek, however it may have efcap'd Notice ; but evidently lies in an Abufe of Lan- oua"e, whereby thofe differen.t Words come to be applied to Things of the fame. Nature ; and each of 'em m their turn to Things wholly different. Whence, any Definition that can hold of 'em univerfally, muff needs be very abftracted, and general ; and may hold of almoft any thing elfe ; and of confequence can _ exprefs very little of the Effence, and obvious Phenomena thereof : To come at which, we muft be at the Pains ot a new Inveftigation. . . -
TO SCIENCE, then, belong fuch Things as Men may difcover by the ufe of Reafomng, and Senle : Whatever the Mind defcries in virtue of that Faculty whereby we perceive Things, and their Relations, is matter of Science : Such are the Laws of Nature, the Affeaions of Bodies, the Rules and Canons of Right and Wrono- Truth and Error, the Properties of Lines and Numbers, &c. Science, in effect, is the Refult of mere Reafon' and Senfe in their general or natural State, as imparted to all Men ; and not modifi d, or circumftan- tiated by any thing peculiar in the Make of a Man's Mind, the Objeas he has been converf>nt among, or the Ideas he has prefent to him. Confequently, Science is no other than a Series of Deductions, or Cdnclu- fions which every Perfon, endued with thofe Faculties, muft, with a proper degree of Attention, i.e, na/ and draw : And A Scienc e, i. e. a form'd Science, is no more than a Syftem of fuch Conclufions, i la- ting to fome one Subject, orderly and artfully laid down in Words, to five Others the Laboui and E.ipence of Dnakinp 'em at firft hand. Thus a Perfon who has all the Ideas exprefs'd in Euclid's Definitions, and fees the immediate Connexion of thofe in his Axioms ; which no Man acquainted with the Language car be fuppofed without ; has it in his Power, with Attention and Induftry, to form all the Theorems and Problems that follow : He has nothing to do but to range thofe Ideas orderly in his Mind, compare 'em togetiier, one by one in all their Changes, and put down the immediate Relations obferv'd in the Comparifon, ,. e. their parity 'imparity, &c. And after the Relations of each to each are thus got ; which make a kind of primary Propbhtions ; to proceed to combine 'em, and take down the Relations refulting from a Comparifon of feveral Combinations. By fuch means, without any other Helps than Penetration and Perfeverance, might he make out an infinite Number of Propofitions : more by half than Euclid has done ; there being a neW Relation i. e. a new Proportion, refulting from every new Combination.
TO ARi on the other hand, belong fuch Things as mere general Reafon would not have attained to: Things which 'lie out of the direct Path of Deduction, and which required a peculiar Caft, or Byafs of Mind to fee or arrive at. A Man might call thefe the Remits of particular, or perfonal Reafon, in oppoBtion to the former ; but that fuch a Denomination would be thought unphilofophical. It may, perhaps, be more iuft to confider the Reafon, here, as modified, or tinctured with fomething in the Complexion, Humour, or Manner of thinking of the Perfon* ; or as reftrain'd or diverted, out of its proper courfe, by fome Views, or Notices peculiar to him. — The Difference between Art and Science, amounts to much the fame as between Wit and Humour ; the former whereof is a general Faculty of exciting agreeable and furprizing Pictures in the. Imagination t, by the affociating of Ideas, which at the fame time have both a notable Diverfity and a Con- fruity ; and the latter, a particular one : The former is pure and abfolute in its kind ; the latter tinged with fomething foreign and complexional. . .
'T I S effential to Art, therefore, as to Humour, to partake of the Perfon from whom it proceeded ; and confequently there are as many Arts, as Inventors of Methods of performing, or doing things. Henc, there is no coming at an Art, otherwife than by learning it. A Perfon left to his own Thought, will fcarce ever hit on the fame thing, unlefs either we fuppofe a marvellous Agreement between the Characters and Cir- cumftances of the Perfons ;°or that the Art is in great meafure fcientifical, and partakes but little of the G:mus
and Humour of the Inventor. There is no fuch thing, properly fpeaking, as ftudying an An or learning a
Science : The firft, every Man befide the Inventor muft be taught ; the latter, every Man mull .'.id. In 'ffect, to attain to an Art, there is fome previous Knowledge requir'd, which a Man's own Reafon would never nave fu^o-efted i whereas a Science requires no more than clear Ideas, and clofe Attention. With thefe H-lps a Man maf of himfelf go the whole length of a Science, fo far as it is properly a Science. Indeed if the Impro^ vers, or rather Writers thereof, have gone a jot out of the common way, in compliance with their own perional Views ; they have fo far adulterated the Science, and put it on the footing of an Art. And to tins very Caufe are owing a great part of the Difficulties we meet withal in attaining the Sciences: The reft art ; from want of Senfe, i. e. of Clearncfs and Precifion in our Perceptions, and want of Perfeverance and Attention to 'em. Thefe render Geometry it-felf, little other than an Art : We want Preliminaries to it as to otner ArtSj And thus every Science is an Art to fome People, and only to be attained, as we do mechanic Arts, by
Habit, and Remembrance; inftead of Contemplation and Deduftion. Reafon, clogg'd and embaralsd by
Genius and Complexion, can no more rife to the heights of Science, than when pure and refin'd, it can deicend to the depths of Art.
S Vd. Boffu, Traite du Poeme Epicjiie, U c. i. } Locke, m Hum. Vnderfland. lih. ii. c. u.
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