- vi The T R E F A 6 %.
THE like Procefs might be obferv'd in the feveral other Arts. Thofe we have hitherto chiefly kept to, have been of the fymbolical Kind : we (hall here give an Inftance in what we call the real Kind viz Architecture.
-■ An Athenian Sculptor, then, obferving an Acanthus (hooting up under a Bafket ; is pleas d with the Figure it
prefents", and taking the Hint, invents the Capital of a Column on the Model thereof : And by a number of like Steps, an entire Order gradually arofe ; and, in time, a whole Art.-~~Things thus advanced ; and another Perfon feein«- a Building framed after fuch manner ; he attentively examines the feveral Members their Forms, Proportions °&c and puts 'em down in writing : And thus does another poftenor Art anfe. And between the two, there ttiil remains the Subordination already obferved between the Means or Occafions of producing 'em ; i e the Rules thus formed being couched in Words, or Language, fupply the Office of the external Objects they were originally deriv'd from, and prove Occafions of raifing Ideas or Images in the Imagination of future Artifts, K> be imitated in the proper Materials _ ' _
THE Arts then of Poetry and Architedure, come firft in at Homer s, and Laliimachus s Senfe, in the fimple Quality of natural Phenomena, or Objects ; which meeting with other Ideas in the Memory, or Imagination, and coniincr to be compared and combined therewith, by the Agency of the Moral View_ or Principle which fuggefl- ed the making of a Poem, &?c> as advantageous and defirable ; new Produdions anle, e. g. a Poem, or a Build- in^ ■ which comin°- at length under the Cognizance and Confideration of Reafon, certain Relations or Analogies
are 'difcovered therein, which tend to propagate, and produce the like at any time. Reafon returns Rules for
Matter ■ which Rules, prove like the Philofopher's Stone, which tends to turn all Materials it is applied to, into Gold ; and the Materials thus tranfmuted, like the pretended multiplicative Virtue of the fame Gold, from every- thing they are applied to, produce Rules again. , . , r „ r , . , ,
REASON in effed, which is the laft Faculty the Matter of Art arrives at, is the firft from which the Form 'or Rules' thereof, which are to propagate it, arife. In which view, Reafon may be laid down as the Prin- ciple of this fecondary Art, or Theory ; as Imagination of the primary one, or of the Matter. We ftill fee the Effed of the firft Laws, even in the latter Art : External Objeas ftrike the Senfe and Imagination fo ftrongly ; that they reach to Reafon ; which, like an infinitely elaftick Subftance, refleds 'em back again ; and thus they again grow into Objeds of Senfe : and fo in a Circle.
THIS fcems to make the two Arts differ very widely : And as Reafon appears our higheft Faculty, (inafmuch as 'tis this alone that tends to produce, and multiply) and accordingly, all our Knowledge appears proportionably higher and purer, as Reafon is more concern'd therein: the Rules or Theory of an Art, appears of infinitely nearer Confequence than the Matter thereof. The former is in fome Senfe adive, and, like the Almighty Mind, tends to produce new Things, new Worlds, new Syftems without end ; the latter is mere Pafiion, and ends in bare Brute Perception.
YET, Ariftotle's Rules, it muft be obferv'd, do not tend to produce Poetry j I mean, not the Matter of Poe- try ; but only the Form. Ariftotle's Art is not the Art of Poetry in that Senfe ; as its Rules don't tend to pro- duce the Enthufiafm. They only give the human Part, and relate what Reafon obferves in the Productions of the Imagination, ;'. e. what there is in 'em that is a proper Objed of this laft Faculty, and comes under its Notice. In effed, Poetry is only fubjed to Ariftotle's Rules, as there is Reafon, not as there is Infpiration or In- vention in its . : „ , j
THE Source of Poetry, we have obferved, lies out of Poetry, in a higher Ground ; and to turn the Stream upon us, is the Bufinefs of this other Art of Infpiration. The immediate Infpiration, is not fo immediate as we might imagine. It is not the ultimate Principle of Art, but is it felf fubordinate to another further, or purer Art ; fo that we muft not have only Art and Rules to produce Poetry, but alfo to produce the Principle thereof, Infpiration, or Invention. And the fame will hold of the Rules of this laft Art, themfelves, which will require others ; and fo in infinitum. At lead, the Series will be infinite, if we only take our felves, and our own Agen- cy into the Account.
TO clear up this a little farther; it is to be obferved, that the Art, e.g. of Poetry, is not only the Refult of another higher Art, as above laid down ; but,' as it confifts of Matter and Form ; thefe are each of 'em the Subied of a particular Art, and each of 'em require another higher Art to produce
'em. The Means, for inftance, neceffary to Infpiration, or the Invention of Images, make one Art ; and
thofe for their Application to the prefent Purpofe, another. So that the Art of Poetry refolves it felf into two fubordinate ones ; the firft of which may be called the Art of Invention, the other the Art of Judg- ment, or Criticifm : each of which has all the Charaders of the general Art ; is come at like it, produces
new Objcds like it, and refolves like it into Matter and Form. Nor does the Matter end here : For as
each of thefe fubordinate Arts, confifts, again, of Matter and Form ; each of 'em refolves lower into two other Arts : and the lame may be faid of each of thefe ; and fo on. So that there is really an infinite Series of Arts, previous to any one, and acceffory thereto ; all diftind from each other, tho all of the fame general Na- ture and Kind, and only differing in Point of Order, or Subordinacy. They anfe fubordinately from the fame Caufe, and tend fubordinately to the fame End : Which Difference, or Subordination, as already noted, arifes only from their greater, or lefs diftance from the Principle of all Knowledge, Senfiition.
UPON the whole, fenfible Nature furnifhes the Matter of them all, by means of the Imagination ; and moral Nature the Form, by means, or light of Reafon.- — The former Propofition has been fufficiently dif- cufs'd. It remains to inquire a little further into the latter : For, that Reafon furnifhes the Means, &c. muft be further qualified, ere it be receiv'd. Our Reafon, it is to be obferv'd, does not perceive any neceffary and im- mediate Connexion between the Means, and the Effed : for there really is none. Confequently Reafon cannot be the Author of 'em ; in regard, the Medium is Wanting whereby it could poflibly attain 'em. So that they muft be procured by fome other Canal , which will at length be found to end in Senfation. In effed, ere we know that fuch Means conduce to fuch End, we muft firft have obferved, or found it fo by Experience. Our Memory fuggefts to us, that fuch or the like Caufes, have been follow'd by fuch or the like Effeds ; which is the only Foundation we have to exped any thing from 'em on the prefent Occafion. — Thus, if Homer's Reafon dired him to retire into a Place free of Noife and Difturbance, at a time when his Mind is clear and in due Temper ; and there to apply himfelf with Attention and Earneftnefs, to think on his Subjed : In con- fequence of which Means, new Ideas and Images prefent themfelves •, fome more immediately relative to the prefent Purpofe, others lefs : Whence comes all this, but that Homer remembers, fuch or the like Ideas as are now wanted, to have arofe upon the ufe of fuch or the like Means? And if, among the Crowd o£ Images, he chufes only fuch as are moft proper, and immediately conducive to his End, and throw afide or expunge the reft -, whence is this, but that he remembers fuch, on former Occafions, to have contributed more fully to Ends like his own ; than fuch others ? So that the whole Procefs appears to be little other than Remembrance; s'hich, we know, refolves into Senfe.
BUT,
