draulic engineer. Should the latter decide to substitute a concrete aqueduct for the open ditch of his predecessors, he does not, in his subsequent calculations, calmly disregard the annual cost of the more efficient medium. The fact that the inadequate ditch was originally built by slave-labor, and was being utilized when he took charge does not mean that it cost nothing. The concrete aqueduct has to be paid for and maintained. For his gain in total revenue the engineer has to face a perpetual charge which slightly diminishes the profit on each second-foot of water, but largely increases the number of second-feet. The political-economist might follow his simple procedure with advantage instead of balking mentally at the disturbance involved in compelling rent, wages and interest to move up and make room for a Cinderella among the economic factors of democracy—namely taxation, the cost of self-imposed order per unit of time.
If the foregoing position is tenable and if it is fully understood that taxation is a basic cost, it can then be conceded that under democracy the cost of order may be taken for granted provided this cost is impersonally distributed at the base of value instead of, as now, at various arbitrarily-milked points of issue.
It is scientifically impossible to construct a non-discretionary measure of economic value unless the cost of order can be impersonally apportioned, or, in other words, until we have a precise and comprehensive system of taxation; and yet any proposal looking toward this end is very offensive to some of the economists. As a matter of fact, so entirely have they insulated the negative components of value from the positive components, that some of them actually relish the idea that our present medley of taxes can be employed punitively to correct alleged social abuses. Any basic simplification put forward induces epithets that even a hardened engineer would blush to employ. Professor Ely writes as follows: “The factors which condition justice or make for equity in taxation are exceedingly numerous; and the mistake most commonly made by superficial thinkers is to seize upon some one element of justice, build a philosophy upon that alone, and vigorously