Page:Debates in the Several State Conventions, v1.djvu/132

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REGULATION OF COMMERCE.
[1785.

courts for the trial of piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and establishing courts for receiving and determining finally appeals in all cases of captures; provided, that no member of Congress shall be appointed judge of any of the said courts.

"That the following letter be addressed to the legislatures of the several states, showing the principles on which the above alteration is proposed:—

"'The United States having formed treaties of commerce with that most Christian king, the king of Sweden, and the States-General of the United Netherlands; and having appointed ministers with full authority to enter into treaties with other powers, upon such principles of reciprocity as may promote their peace, harmony, and respective interests; it becomes necessary that such internal arrangements should be made as may strictly comport with the faith of those treaties, and insure success to their future negotiations. But in the pursuit of the means necessary for the attainment of these ends, considerable difficulties arise. If the legislature of each state adopts its own measures, many and very eminent disadvantages must, in their opinion, necessarily result therefrom. They apprehend it will be difficult for thirteen different legislatures, acting separately and distinctly, to agree in the same interpretation of a treaty, to take the same measures for carrying it into effect, and to conduct their several operations upon such principles as to satisfy those powers, and at the same time to preserve the harmony and interests of the Union; or to concur in those measures which may be necessary to counteract the policy of those powers with whom they shall not be able to form commercial treaties, and who avoid it merely from an opinion of their imbecility and indecision. And if the several states levy different duties upon their particular produce, exported to the ports of those powers, or upon the produce and manufactures of those powers imported into each state, either in vessels navigated by and belonging to the citizens of these states, or the subjects of those powers, it will, they apprehend, induce, on their part, similar discriminations in the duties upon the commercial intercourse with each state, and thereby defeat the object of those treaties, and promote the designs of those who wish to profit from their embarrassment.

"'Unless the United States in Congress assembled are authorized to make those arrangements which become necessary under their treaties, and are enabled to carry them into effect, they cannot complain of a violation of them on the part of other powers. And unless they act in concert, in the system of policy which may be necessary to frustrate the designs of those powers who lay injurious restraints on their trade, they must necessarily become the victims of their own indiscretion.

"'The common principle upon which a friendly commercial intercourse is conducted between independent nations, is that of reciprocal advantages; and if this is not obtained, it becomes the duty of the losing party to make such further regulations, consistently with the faith of treaties, as will remedy the evil, and secure its interests. If, then, the commercial regulations of any foreign power contravene the interests of any particular state,—if they refuse admittance to its produce into its ports upon the same terms that the state admits its manufactures here—what course will it take to remedy the evil? If it makes similar regulations to counteract those of that power, by reciprocating the disadvantages which it feels, by impost or otherwise, will it produce the desired effect? What operation will it have upon the neighboring states? Will they enter into