Page:Debates in the Several State Conventions, v1.djvu/478

the system is unjust or unsafe, I would be against it. There has been much fallacy in the argument advanced by the gentleman from Maryland. He has, without adverting to many manifest distinctions, considered confederacies and treaties as standing on the same basis. In the one, the powers act collectively, in the other individually. Suppose, for example, that France, Spain, and some of the smaller states in Europe, should treat on war or peace, or on any other general concern; it would be done on principles of equality. But if they were to form a plan of general government, would they give, or are the greater states obliged to give to the lesser, the same and equal legislative powers? Surely not. They might differ on this point, but no one can say that the large states were wrong in refusing this concession. Nor can the gentleman's reasoning apply to the present powers of Congress; for they may, and do, in some cases, affect property—and in case of war, the lives of the citizens. Can any of the lesser states be endangered by an adequate representation? Where is the probability of a combination? What the inducements? Where is the similarity of customs, manners, or religion? If there possibly can be a diversity of interest, it is the case of the three large states. Their situation is remote, their trade different. The staple of Massachusetts is fish, and the carrying trade; of Pennsylvania, wheat and flour; of Virginia, tobacco. Can states thus situated in trade ever form such a combination? Do we find those combinations in the larger counties in the different state governments to produce rivalships? Does not the history of the nations of the earth verify it? Rome rivalled Carthage, and could not be satisfied before she was destroyed. The houses of Austria and Bourbon acted on the same view; and the wars of France and England have been waged through rivalship; and let me add, that we, in a great measure, owe our independency to those national contending passions. France, through this motive, joined us. She might, perhaps, with less expense, have induced England to divide America between them. In Greece, the contention was ever between the larger states. Sparta against Athens—and these again, occasionally, against Thebes,—were ready to devour each other. Germany presents the same prospects—Prussia against Austria. Do the greater provinces in Holland endanger the liberties of the lesser? And