arbiter for adjusting every contention among the states. In all their connections, therefore, with each other, and particularly in commerce, which will probably create the greatest discord, it ought to hold the reins.
It follows, too, that the general government ought to protect each state against domestic as well as external violence.
And, lastly, it follows that through the general government alone can we ever assume the rank to which we are entitled by our resources and situation.
Should the people of America surrender these powers, they can be paramount to the constitutions and ordinary acts of legislation only by being delegated by them. I do not pretend to affirm, but I venture to believe, that, if the Confederation had been solemnly questioned in opposition to our Constitution, or even to one of our laws posterior to it, it must have given way; for never did it obtain a higher ratification than a resolution of Assembly in the daily form.
This will be one security against encroachment. But another, not less effectual, is, to exclude the individual states from any agency in the national government, as far as it may be safe, and their interposition may not be absolutely necessary.
But now, sir, permit me to declare that, in my humble judgment, the powers by which alone the blessings of a general government can be accomplished, cannot be interwoven in the Confederation without a change in its very essence; or, in other words, that the Confederation must be thrown aside. This is almost demonstrable, from the inefficacy of requisitions, and from the necessity of converting them into acts of authority. My suffrage, as a citizen, is also for additional powers. But to whom shall we commit these acts of authority—these additional powers? To Congress? When I formerly lamented the defects in the jurisdiction of Congress, I had no view to indicate any other opinion, than that the federal head ought not to be so circumscribed; for, free as I am at all times to profess my reverence for that body, and the individuals who compose it, I am yet equally free to make known my aversion to repose such a trust in a tribunal so constituted. My objections are not the visions of theory, but the result of my own observations in America, and of the experience of others abroad.
1. The legislative and executive are concentrated in the same persons. This, where real power exists, must eventuate in tyranny.
2. The representation of the states bears no proportion to their importance. This is an unreasonable subjection of the will of the majority to that of the minority.
3. The mode of election, and the liability of being recalled, may too often render the delegates rather partisans of their own states than representatives of the Union.
4. Cabal and intrigue must consequently gain an ascendency in a course of years.
5. A single house of legislation will sometimes be precipitate, perhaps passionate.
6. As long as seven states are required for the smallest, and nine for the greatest votes, may not foreign influence, at some future day, insinuate itself, so as to interrupt every active exertion?
7. To crown the whole, it is scarce within the verge of possibility that so numerous an assembly should acquire that secrecy, despatch, and vigor, which are the test of excellence in the executive department.
