sition of states to federal measures had proceeded much more from the officers of the states than from the people at large.
Mr. MADISON considered the popular election of one branch of the national legislature as essential to every plan of free government. He observed, that, in some of the states, one branch of the legislature was composed of men already removed from the people by an intervening body of electors; that, if the first branch of the general legislature should be elected by the state legislatures, the second branch elected by the first, the executive by the second together with the first, and other appointments again made for subordinate purposes by the executive, the people would be lost sight of altogether, and the necessary sympathy between them and their rulers and officers too little felt. He was an advocate for the policy of refining the popular appointments by successive filtrations, but thought it might be pushed too far. He wished the expedient to be resorted to only in the appointment of the second branch of the legislature, and in the executive and judiciary branches of the government. He thought, too, that the great fabric to be raised would be more stable and durable, if it should rest on the solid foundation of the people themselves, than if it should stand merely on the pillars of the legislatures.
Mr. GERRY did not like the election by the people. The maxims taken from the British constitution were often fallacious when applied to our situation, which was extremely different. Experience, he said, had shown that the state legislatures, drawn immediately from the people, did not always possess their confidence. He had no objection, however, to an election by the people, if it were so qualified that men of honor and character might not be unwilling to be joined in the appointments. He seemed to think the people might nominate a certain number, out of which the state legislatures should be bound to choose.
Mr. BUTLER thought an election by the people an impracticable mode.
On the question for an election of the first branch of the national legislature by the people,—
Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, Georgia, ay, 6, New Jersey, South Carolina, no, 2; Connecticut, Delaware, divided.
The remaining clauses of the fourth resolution, relating to the qualifications of members of the national legislature, being postponed, nem. con., as entering too much into detail for general propositions,—
The committee proceeded to the fifth resolution, that the second [or senatorial] branch of the national legislature ought to be chosen, by the first branch, out of persons nominated by the state legislatures.
Mr. SPAIGHT contended, that the second branch ought to be chosen by the state legislatures, and moved an amendment to that effect.
Mr. BUTLER apprehended, that the taking so many powers out of the hands of the states as was proposed tended to destroy all that balance and security of interests among the states which it was necessary to
vol. v.18
