There was desperate fighting, and Gregg was compelled to fall back. He did so none too soon, for as he was leaving Brandy Station he could see the head of Ewell's corps debarking from a train which Lee had sent over in great haste from Culpepper.
Buford and Gregg joined forces and retreated over the river.
The importance of the engagement of Brandy Station lies chiefly in the fact that it disclosed a part of Lee's plans to Hooker. It was also the first time that the Union cavalry had boldly attacked the Confederate cavalry.
It did not change Lee's plans, nor did it trouble Stuart very much. While Hooker knew that Lee with much of his army was at Culpepper, he still did not know how far he intended to go. He extended his right wing along the upper Rappahannock so as to meet Lee's change of base, and be prepared for any emergency.
Lee proceeded with his campaign with his usual vigor. Ewell's corps was pushed forward into the valley of Virginia, marching on the 10th. It was in light order and advanced rapidly, crossing the Blue Ridge at Chester Gap, and reaching the banks of the Shenandoah at Cedarville on the 12th. The Unionists knew nothing of this movement, and Ewell took advantage of their ignorance to press forward against McReynolds' Union brigade under Milroy, at Winchester. Milroy was taken by surprise and overwhelmed by numbers. He was driven out of Winchester on the 14th, and was attacked on his retreat. The retreat became a rout and his men scattered. Some escaped to Harper's Ferry, but nearly 4,000 were captured. The fleeing men created a panic in Pennsylvania, and caused a profound sensation in the North.
Hooker learned on the 12th that Ewell's corps had passed Sperryville, and on the following day he moved the 2d, 6th, and 12th corps to Fairfax Court-House.
When Hill saw that the Unionists had withdrawn he
