strong positions around Gettysburg. He dismounted his men and deployed them as infantry in such positions as would best conceal their numerical weakness. Of his 4,200 men, one quarter had to be withdrawn to look after the horses, so that really only about 3,000 were prepared to oppose Lee's advance. They were disposed in a circular arc from west to northeast of Gettysburg, with Gamble's brigade on the left and Devin's on the right.
On the morning of July 1st Buford's scouts reported that Heth's division (Confederate) was rapidly advancing from the direction of Cashtown. The battle was imminent. Heth deployed his two advance brigades south of the Chambersburg road, and at eight o'clock his line, preceded by skirmishers, passed down the slopes on the right bank of Willoughby Run. Buford opened fire, and a fierce struggle followed on the banks of the stream. Buford's fire was so well sustained that Heth thought he had an infantry corps opposed to him. This idea prevented him from advancing to take possession of Gettysburg and he waited for Pender's troops to reinforce him.
Buford was terribly overmatched, and realizing that he could not resist much longer, he eagerly watched the Emmettsburg road for signs of Reynolds. Hill and Pender were pushing forward, when the signalman stationed in the belfry of the seminary on Seminary Hill discovered a large column of infantry moving forward on the Emmettsburg road where only friends could come.
It was Reynolds whom the sound of battle had hurried forward at his utmost speed. Wadsworth's division soon followed. Reynolds rode on ahead and met Buford on the stairs of the belfry. A moment sufficed to tell of the critical situation. Reynolds ordered Wadsworth's division to relieve Gamble's men, who had suffered greatly. He sent word to the other two divisions to hasten, and also notified Howard, requesting him to hurry forward with the 11th corps.
