Opinion of the Court
law were to apply to the Disputed Instruments, then the abandoned proceeds would escheat inequitably solely to the State of incorporation, just like the money orders expressly referenced in the statute.[1]
B
Delaware’s various arguments as to why the Disputed Instruments should not qualify as “other similar written instrument[s]” within the meaning of §2503 are unpersuasive.
First up in Delaware’s attempt to distinguish the Disputed Instruments from money orders for FDA purposes is its contention that the term “money order” in the FDA refers to a specific commercial product that is labeled “money order” by the seller and is generally sold in low values to low-income individuals as a substitute for ordinary personal checks. Delaware does not point to any dictionary that includes those additional attributes in its definition of “money order,” nor do any of our prior cases that describe Western Union money orders mention such features. See Pennsylvania, 407 U. S., at 208–209; Western Union Telegraph Co., 368 U. S., at 72–73. Moreover, while Delaware offers two encyclopedia entries that suggest money orders are “especially helpful to persons who do not have checking accounts,”[2] neither source says that the typical or intended user is, itself, an attribute of a money order.
Delaware also tries to highlight various ways in which the Disputed Instruments can be said to differ from money orders, as Delaware describes them, including differences
- ↑ Indeed, the facts of these very cases reflect the inequitable escheatment dynamic that is at the heart of the FDA: According to the Defendant States, Delaware took $250 million between 2002 and 2017 pursuant to the common law’s escheatment rules with respect to Disputed Instruments that were purchased across the Nation, whereas, if the FDA applied, that State would have been entitled to only about $1 million.
- ↑ 15 Compton’s Encyclopedia and Fact-Index 430 (1970); see also Glenn G. Munn’s Encyclopedia of Banking and Finance 581 (rev. 7th ed. 1973).
