Sotomayor, J., dissenting
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 17–5554
DENARD STOKELING, PETITIONER v. UNITED STATES
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
[January 15, 2019]
Justice Sotomayor, with whom The Chief Justice, Justice Ginsburg, and Justice Kagan join, dissenting.
In Johnson v. United States, 559 U. S. 133 (2010), this Court ruled that the words “physical force” in the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U. S. C. §924(e)(2), denote a heightened degree of force, rather than the minimal contact that would have qualified as “force” for purposes of the common-law crime of battery. Id., at 139–140. This case asks whether Florida robbery requires such “physical force,” and thus qualifies as a “violent felony” under the ACCA, even though it can be committed through use of only slight force. See §924(e)(2)(B). Under Johnson, the answer to that question is no. Because the Court’s contrary ruling distorts Johnson, I respectfully dissent.
I
As the majority explains, petitioner Denard Stokeling pleaded guilty in 2016 to being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U. S. C. §922(g)(1). The Government and the probation department argued for an increased sentence under the ACCA. Stokeling objected.
The ACCA imposes a 15-year mandatory-minimum sentence on any §922(g) offender who has been convicted of at least three qualifying predicate convictions. §924(e)(1). As relevant here, a past conviction can qualify
