Sotomayor, J., dissenting
reason not to apply Johnson as it was written.
IV
This Court’s decision in Johnson tells us that when Congress wrote the words “physical force” in the context of a statute targeting “violent felon[ies],” it eschewed the common-law meaning of those words and instead required a higher degree of force. See 559 U. S., at 138–143, 145. Johnson resolves this case. Florida law requires no more than minimal force to commit Florida robbery, and Florida law therefore defines that crime more broadly than Congress defined the elements clause. The crime that most people think of when they think of “robbery” is a serious one. That is all the more reason, however, that this Court should not allow a dilution of the
Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 17–A, §651(1)(D) (2018 Cum. Supp.); Md. Crim. Law Code Ann. §3–403(a)(2) (2012); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §750.529 (West 2004); Minn. Stat. §609.245(2) (2018); Miss. Code Ann. §97–3–79 (2014); Mo. Rev. Stat. §§570.023(1)(1), (3)–(4) (2016); Neb. Rev. Stat. §§28–324, 28–1205 (2015); N. H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §636:1(III)(b) (2016); N. Y. Penal Law Ann. §§160.10(2)(a)–(b), 160.15(1), (3)–(4) (West 2015); N. D. Cent. Code Ann. §§12.1–22–01(1)–(2) (2012); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§2911.01(A)(1), (3) (Lexis 2014); Okla. Stat. Ann., Tit. 21, §§797(1)–(3), 801 (2015); Ore. Rev. Stat. §§164.405(1)(a), 164.415(1)(b)–(c) (2017); 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§3701(a)(1)(i)–(ii), (iv) (2015); R. I. Gen. Laws §11–39–1(a) (2002); S. D. Codified Laws §22–30–6 (2017); Tenn. Code Ann. §§39–13–402(a), 39–13–403(a) (2011); Tex. Penal Code Ann. §29.03(a) (West 2011); Utah Code §§76–6–302(1)(a)–(b) (2017); V t. Stat. Ann., Tit. 13, §608(c) (2009); V a. Code Ann. §§18.2–53.1, 18.2–58 (2014); Wash. Rev. Code §§9A.56.200(1)(a)(ii)–(iii) (2015); W. V a. Code Ann. §61–2–12(a) (Lexis 2014); Wis. Stat. §943.32(2) (2005); Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§6–2–401(c) (2017); see also Reply Brief 22–23; App. to Reply Brief 9a–18a (listing 29 States with aggravated-robbery statutes that could have qualified at the time of the ACCA’s enactment because of a weapon-using, weapon-displaying, or weapon-representing element; an additional 10 States, excluding duplicates, that could have potentially qualified at that time because of a physical-injury element; and an additional 15 States, some duplicative, with potentially qualifying statutes that have been enacted since).
