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Syllabus

Note: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION ET AL. v. BROWN ET AL.
CERTIORARI BEFORE JUDGMENT TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 22–535. Argued February 28, 2023—Decided June 30, 2023

To alleviate hardship expected to be caused by the impending resumption of federal student-loan repayments that had been suspended during the multi-year coronavirus pandemic, Secretary of Education Miguel Cardona announced a substantial student-loan debt-forgiveness plan (Plan). The Plan discharges $10,000 to $20,000 of an eligible borrower’s debt, depending on criteria such as the borrower’s income and the type of loan held. The Secretary invoked the Higher Education Relief Opportunities for Students Act of 2003 (HEROES Act), which authorizes the Secretary “to waive or modify any provision” applicable to federal “student financial assistance” programs “as may be necessary to ensure that … recipients of student financial assistance” are no worse off “financially in relation to that financial assistance because” of a national emergency or disaster. 20 U. S. C. §§1098bb(a)(1), (a)(2)(A), 1098ee(2)(C)–(D). The HEROES Act also exempts rules promulgated pursuant to it from the otherwise-applicable negotiated-rulemaking and notice-and-comment processes.

Before the Plan took effect, various plaintiffs—including respondents here—sued to enjoin it. Respondents Myra Brown and Alexander Taylor are two borrowers who do not qualify for the maximum relief available under the Plan. Their one-count complaint alleges that the Secretary was required to follow notice-and-comment and negotiated-rulemaking procedures in promulgating the Plan, which all agree he did not do. Brown and Taylor argue that the HEROES Act’s procedural exemptions apply only when the rule promulgated is substantively authorized by the Act, and because the HEROES Act does not authorize the Plan (they argue), the Secretary was required to follow negotiated rulemaking and notice and comment. The District Court