Page:Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology (1870) - Volume 1.djvu/356

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loc cit.
loc cit.

338 ARTSTOTELES. exist only when the essence of the particular, the vorT6v^ i, e. the conceivable, the reasonable, is perceived. (Met. viL 6.) It presupposes the principles of the intellectual and real, and has reference to that which is demonstrable from them. The individual sciences deduce from principles the truth of the particular by means of proof, which is the foundation of knowledge. Their limit consiste in this : that the individual science sets out from something presupposed, which is recognized, and deduces the rest from this by means of conclusion (syllogism). That operation of the mind which refers the particular to the universal, is the reflect- ing understanding (Siduoia), which is opposed as well to sensuous perception as to the higher opera- tion of the reason. With it the diiference between existence and thought, between truth and false- hood, becomes a matter of consciousness. Every single science has reference to a definite ob- ject (7€»'oj, Anal. post. i. 28, Alet. xi. 7), and seeks certain principles and causes of it. The particular object therefore determines the science, and every science deduces tlie proof out nf t/ie principles pecu- liar to it^ i. e. out of the essential definitions of the jKirticular object. Three things are presupposed ibr every particular science : a. That its object, and the essential definitions of that object (t. e. the principles peculiar to it), exist, b. The common principles (axioms), and c. The signification of the essential attributes of the object According to their common principles, all sciences are mutually connected. Such common principles are, for ex- ample, the law of contradiction. The accuracy {dtxpiSna) of the single sciences depends on the nature of their objects. The less this is an object of sense, the more accurate is the science of it. {Met. xiii. 3; Anal. post. i. 27; Met. iv. 1, i. 2.) Therefore metaphysics is the most accurate, but also the most difficult smence. A knowledge of the kind of scientific treatment which the subject in hand requires must be ac- quired by intellectual cultivation. To wish to apply in all cases the method and schematism of a philosophy, which in constructing its theories begins from the fundamental idea (ciKpiSm), is pediintic (dveKcvdfpou, Met. i. 1, p. 29, Brand). Natural science, for example, does not admit of the application of a mere abstract definition of the idea, for it has to take into consideration as well the manifold, as also the accidental. The same may be said of the province of practical science, where, in ethics and politics, universal, thorough definitions are not always possible, but the true can often be exhibited only in outline (iv rvwcp^ Eth. Nic. i. 1, ii. 2, ix. 2). For the practical has also to do with the individual, and therefore acci- dental For that reason, experience and what is matter of fact, have a high value as the proper basis of cognition. For the individual existence (roSe ri) with its formative principle, is the really substantial ; and the sensuously perceptible essences and those which are universal are almost the same natures (Met xiii. 9, p. 1086, 2 Bekk.) It is only in tliz individual that tlie universal attains reality. The particular sciences have for their object the cognition of the world of appearances in its essen- tial characteristics. For this purpose the co-opera- tion of the senses is necessary. Therefore here the proposition, nikil est in inteUectu quod non fuerit in sensUf holds good. (De Anim. iii. 8.) In the ARISTOTELEs. vovs irad-qriKos the sensible, finite world is a ne- cessary production of cognition. It attains to the cognition of nothing without sensuous perception. But it is only the vovs iroirfTiKos which attains to the cognition of the complete truth of the sensible world, and here vice versa the proposition holds good: nildl est in sensu, quod non ftierii i?i in- tellectu. Reason is either theoretical or practical reason (de Anim. m. 10). The object of the first is the cognition ef truth (of the universal, the unchange- able) ; the object of the other is the realisation, by means of action, of the truth, the cognition of which has been attained. (Metaph. iL 1.) Prac- tical reason, therefore, is directed to the particular and individual, which is determined and regulated by the universal. (Eth. Nic. vi. 12.) The scientific treatment of the moral (ethics and politics) has, therefore, to investigate not so much what virtue is ( ov yap ii eiSwixev ri ecTTiv ij dperri aKeirTo^eOa, Eth. Nic. ii. 2), as rather how we may become vir- tuous (aKK' iv dyadol yevto/ieda). Without this last object it would be of no use. The dificrence be- tween action and the exercise of the creative power (irpiTTciv and iroiiiv) in the province of practical reason, is the foundation of the difference between morality and art. What is common to both is, that the commencing point of the activity lies here in the subject (Met. xi. 7), and that the ob- ject of the activity has reference to that which admits of different modes of existence. (Eth. Nic. vi. 4.) The difference, thererefore, between the two is this: that in action (TrpdrTeiv) the pur- pose lies in the activity itself (in the irpuKTov), whereby the will of the actor manifests itself, while in the exercise of the creative power (Trotelv) it lies in the work produced. (Metaph. vL 1 ; Magn. Mor. L 35.) The theoretical sciences have to do with that which exists in accordance with the idea, and can be deduced from it. Their object is either, a. the universal, as it is the object of cognition to the abstracting understanding, which, however, is still restricted to one side of the material, to the quan- titative (Met. xiii. 2), — accordingly rd dKiv-qra dA' ov x^wp'O'To ; or, 6. the universal, as by means of the formative principles, which give it some definitive shape, it attains to existence in the essences of natural things (to dx(»>pi(TTa dKK' ovic dKivrjTa) ; c. or lastly, their object is the universal, as it exhibits itself as necessary existence (to didiov Ka dKivTjTov Kol x^pto'Toi'). Out of these the theoretic sciences of mathematics, physics, and theology develop themselves, as well as the prac- tical sciences, which have for their object action, morality in the individual and in the state (ethics, oeconomics, politics), or the exercise of the creative faculty, and art (poetics, rhetoric). A. The Theoretical Sciences. 1. Natural Sciences. The science of Physics (tj (pvcriK-q, ?} irepi (pvaews eiriaT-^fj.Ti) considers that existence which is susceptible of motion. Its object is not the idea in its spiritual existence (to tI t]V elj/ot), but the idea in its real existence in the material (to Tt ecTTt). Natural existence has the origin of motion in itself originally. Motion is change from what exists to what exists. Nature, therefore, is no lifeless substratum, but an organization pos-