Page:Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology (1870) - Volume 3.djvu/1328

1316 ZENON. de Fin. iii. 6. 8 ; comp, Diog. Laert. vii. 100, &c.), with the attainment of which, consequently, hap- piness must be coincident (Stob. I.e. p. 138). This he described as perfect unanimity of life {o/uLoXoyov- fievoos C^v, Stob. /. c. p. 132, 134; Cic. de Fin. I. c), which in its turn should manifest itself as the un- hindered flow of life {iijpoia rod ^iov, Stob. /. c. p. 138 ; Diog. Laert. vii. 88; Sext. Emp. Hypot. iii. 172). Unanimity of life however can only be at- tained (so Zenon already appears to have added in discussing the point, see Diog. Laert. vii. 87, &c.), in proportion as it in its turn is in complete har- mony with the rest of nature. The further deve- lopment and more exact definition of this subject however belongs to Cleanthes,Chrysippus, and other successors of Zenon (Diog. Laert. vii. 89, &c.). Perfect unanimity of life however can only be achieved through the unrestricted dominion of right reason, that is, by our reason not only ruling unconditionally over our other energies and circum- stances, but also coinciding with the universal reason — the reason which governs nature. This last is, in other words, the source of moral law, of that which forbids as well as that which commands (Stob. I.e. p. 104 ; comp. Plut. Stoic. Rep. p. 1037). Since then that unvarying unanimity or con- sistency of soul, out of which morally good volitions and actions spring, is virtue (Stob. /. c. p. 104 ; Cic. Tusc. iv. 15), true good can only consist in virtue (Stob. p. 90 ; Diog. Laert. vii. 102, 127), and this being self-sufficient, can need no external good circumstances (Diog. Laert. vii. 104 ; Cic. de Fin. iii. 10 ; Sen. Epist. 9; Plut. I. c.). That, to the accomplishment or attainment of which virtue is directed, has no value in itself, but on the con- trary derives value only from its being willed and accomplished morally (Stob. I. c. p. 94). And it was just at this point that Zenon felt himself con- strained to deviate from the Cynics. He could not admit that things indifferent in themselves are without any value for us. On the contrary, he endeavoured to point out differences which fixed the measure of their relative value. They have this, according to him, in proportion as they correspond to the original natural instinct of self- preservation (Diog. Laert. vii. 85 ; Cic. de Fin. iii. 5, 15, iv. 10, V. 9, Acad. i. 16). What corresponds to that is justly preferred (is a TrpoT]yix4pov has a certain worth (a^ia, Stob. I. c. p. 144, &c. 156 ; comp. Diog. Laert. vii. 105), and admits of being shown to be such, that is, of having a foundation for it established (Cic. Acad. i. 10, &c. ; Stob. I. e. p. 158 ; Diog. Laert. vii. 108). But because every thing which conduces to self preservation, like self-preservation itself, has only a conditional (relative) value, it cannot be a constituent element of happiness; the latter depends merely upon moral volition and action (Cic. de Fin. iii. 1 3). That which is to be preferred is an appropriate thing (ko^^koi'), a designation which Zenon first intro- duced (Diog. Laert. l.c. and shows itself to be such by its rational foundation (ef/Aoyov, Diog. Laert. and Stob. II. cc.). The appropriate, however, and its foundation, are perfect only when the latter is unconditional, that is, corresponds to unconditional requirements (a KaTopOw/xa, Stob. p. 158 ; Cic. de Fin. iii. 7, 9, 14, 17, de Of. i. 3). So long as an action can merely be justified as fit, it is a middling (fieaoy) action, and has no real moral value, even though it should perfectly coincide with a truly moral action in reference to its object or purport. ZENON. (Stob. p. 158; Cic. de Fin. I. c.) It is not without reason that the germ of the distinction between legality and morality has been traced in this Stoic separation of the KadrjKov and Karopdw/uLa. Hence, just as morality, or virtue, can only subsist in con- junction with the perfect dominion of reason, so vice can consist only in the renunciation of the authority of right reason, and virtue is absolutely — without anv accommodation — opposed to vice (Cic. Tusc. iv/l3, Acad. i. 10, de Fin. iii. 21. iv. 9, Parad. iii. 1 ; Diog. Laert. vii. 127; Stob. p. 104, 116); nay, virtue and vice cannot subsist side by side in one and the same subject, can admit of no increase and decrease (Cic. de Fin. iii. 14, &c.), and no one moral action can be more virtuous than another (Cic. de Fin. iii. 14; Sext. Emp. adv. Math. vii. 422). All actions however are to be reckoned in, that is, all are either good or bad, since even impulses and desires rest upon free consent (Stob. p. 162, 164 ; Cic. Tusc. iv. 9, Acad. i. 10), and consequently even passive conditions or affections, which, because withdrawn from the dominion of reason, are immoral (Diog. Laert. vii. 110 ; Stob. p. 166 ; Cic. Tusc. iv, 6. 14), nay, more, they are the source of immoral actions (Stob. p. 170, &c. ; Cic. de Fin. iv. 38 ; Plut. de Virt. mor. p. 393). Zenon, therefore, had already especially concerned himself with the more exact definition of the affec- tions, and had composed a separate treatise on them, as has been above remarked. To him belongs the fourfold division of them. He referred them to present {Trp6(T(paTov), and therefore operative errors (ftilse assumptions) respecting the good and the bad (Cic. Tusc. iii. 3 ; Stob. p. 170). They must be rooted out, and not merely set aside (Cic. Tusc. iv. 18, &c.), and their place must be occupied by corresponding movements of the reason. As he was the originator of the fourfold division of the affections (desire and fear, pleasure and pain : eVt- Ovfila, ^6§os, 7}5oj/i], Auirri; Cic, Tusc. iv. 6 ; Stob. p. 166, &c. ; Diog. Laert. vii. 110), so in all pro- bability he also distinguished the three emotions which are according to reason (fiovr]ais, x^P"* evAaSela,) and assumed that pain, because it is merely passive, cannot be transformed into a cor- responding rational emotion. In like manner to him probably, in what is essential, belong the definitions of the four virtues, as well as the assertions, subsequently repeated to satiety, re- specting the perfections of the wise man. How far he carried these out, and whether, or how far he conducted the further sub-division of the four virtues, we are not able to determine. Polemon is said already to have given utterance to the suspicion that Zenon intended to purloin other people's doctrines in order to appropriate them to himself in a new dress (Diog. Laert. vii. 25). At a later time he was frequently charged with having been the inventor not so much of new things, as of new words (Cic. de Fin. iii. 2, iv. 2, &c.. Tusc. V. 12), and already Chrysippus had endeavoured to defend him against such charges (Diog. Laert. vii. 122). But though those charges may in part have been unjust, yet even the acute- ness of Chrysippus and others was not able to develop out of the doctrines of Zenon an organi- cally constructed system, growing out of one fundamental idea, such as we find in Plato and Aristotle. Logic and physic always continued mere supplements of ethic, connected with it ratheJ externally than internally ; and the system of the