city. His whole system of emanations seems in fact to be a realization of the logical subordination of ideas. The simplest ideas which are contained in those which are composite being regarded by him as the principles of things.
The emanations of Proclus proceeded in a
curious triadic manner. That which precedes all
power, and emanates immediately from the primal
cause of all things, is limit. The power or force
which produces existence is infinitude (Theol. Plat.
iii. p. 133). From these two principia arises a
third, a compound of the two — substance (as a
sort of genus of all substances), that which in itself
is absolutely an existing thing and nothing more
{l. c. p. 1 35). Everything, according to Proclus,
contains in itself being ((
Greek characters)), life ((Greek characters)), and intelligence ((Greek characters)). The life is the centre of the
thing, for it is both an object of thought and exists.
The intelligence is the limit of the thing, for the
intellect ((Greek characters)) is in that which is the object of intellect ((Greek characters)), and the latter in the former; but
the intellect or thought exists in the thing thought
of objectively, and the thing thought of exists in
the intellect productively ((Greek characters)). This accordingly is the first triad, limit, infinitude, and the
compound of the two. Of these the first — the
limit — is the deity who advances to the extreme
verge of the conceivable from the inconceivable,
primal deity, measuring and defining all things,
and establishes the paternal, concatenating and
immaculate race of gods. The infinite is the inexhaustible power of this deity. The " mixed " is
the first and highest world of gods, which in a
concealed manner comprehends everything within
itself.
Out of this first triad springs the second. As
the first of the unities produces the highest existing thing, the intermediate unity produces the
intermediate existent thing, in which there is
something first — unity, divinity, reality; some-
thing intermediate — power ; and something last —
the existence in the second grade, conceivable life
((Greek characters)); for there is in everything which is
the object of thought, being ((Greek characters)) life ((Greek characters)),
and thought ((Greek characters)). The third of the unities,
the " mixed," produces the third triad, in which
the intelligence or thinking power ((Greek characters)) attains to
its subsistence. This thinking power is the limit
and completion of everything which can be the ob-
ject of thought. The first triad contains the prin-
ciple of union, — the second of multiplicity and
increase by means of continuous motion or life,
for motion is a species of life, — the third, the
principle of the separation of the manifold, and of
formation by means of limit.
In his treatise on Providence and Fate, Proclus
seeks to explain the difference between the two,
and to show that the second is subordinate to the
first in such a manner that freedom is consistent
with it. Both providence and fate are causes, the
first the cause of all good, the second the cause of
all connection (and connection as cause and effect).
There are three sorts of things, some whose operation is as eternal as their substance, others whose
substance does not exist, but is perpetually coming
into existence, and, between these, things whose
substance is eternal, but whose pperation takes
place in time. Proclus names these three kinds
intellectual, animal and corporeal. The last alone
are subjected to fate, which is identical with na-
(Greek characters) and is itself subject to providence, which is
nothing else than the deity himself. The corporeal part of man is entirely subject to fate. The
soul, as regards its substance, is superior to fate;
as regards its operation, sometimes (referring to
those operations which require corporeal organs
and motions) beneath, sometimes superior to fate,
and so forms the bond of connection between intellectual and corporeal existence. The freedom
of the soul consists in its living according to virtue,
for this alone does not involve servitude. Wickedness on the other hand is want of power, and by
it the soul is subjected to fate, and is compelled to
serve all that ministers to or hinders the gratification of the desires. Proclus strongly distinguished the soul from that which is material,
pointing out its reflective power as a mark of difference; the corporeal not being able to turn back
in that way upon itself, owing to its consisting of
separable parts. He founded on this also an argument for the immortality of the soul. (Inst. Theol. 15.) Some of the topics touched upon in
this treatise are carried out still further in the
essay On Ten Questions about Providence.
In the treatise on the origin of evil ((Greek characters)), Proclus endeavours to
show that evil does not originate with God, or
with the daemons, or with matter. Evil is the consequence of a weakness, the absence of some power.
As with the total absence of all power activity
would be annihilated, there cannot be any total,
unmixed evil. The good has one definite, eternal,
universally operating cause, namely God. The
causes of evil are manifold, indefinite, and not
subject to rule. Evil has not an original, but only
a derivative existence.
The following works of Proclus are still extant;
—1. (Greek characters), in six books.
2. (Greek characters) (Institutio Theoloyica).
This treatise was first published in the Latin translation of Franciscus Patricius. The Greek text,
with the translation of Aem. Portus, is appended
to the edition of the last-mentioned work, published
at Hamburgh in 1618. 3. A commentary on the
First Alcibiades of Plato. 4. A commentary on
the Timaeus of Plato. Of this commentary on the
Timaeus five books remain, but they only treat of
about a third of the dialogue. It is appended to
the first Basle edition of Plato. 5. Various notes
on the (Greek characters) of Plato, printed in the same
edition of Plato as the last-mentioned work. 6. A
commentary on the Parmenides of Plato, published
in Stallbaum's edition of that dialogue. 7. Portions
of a commentary on the Cratylus of Plato, edited by
Boissonade, Lips. 1 820. 8. A paraphrase of various
difficult passages in the (Greek characters) of
Ptolemaeus: first published, with a preface, by
Melanchthon, at Basle, 1554. 9. A treatise on
motion ((Greek characters)), a sort of compendium of
the last five books of Aristotle's treatise (Greek characters). 10. (Greek characters) (Basle, 1520). 11. (Greek characters), frequently appended to the works of the ancient astronomers. There are also several separate editions
of it. 12. A commentary on the first book of
Euclid's elements (attached to various editions of
the text of Euclid). 13. A commentary on the
(Greek characters) of Hesiod, in a somewhat mutilated form ((Greek characters)), first published at Venice in 1537. A
better edition is that by Heinsius (Leyden, 1603).
14. (Greek characters) or rather some
