| that Hasdrubal, in the Second Punic War, bought 5000 at one time (Appian. Pun. 9); and they were doubtless kept in constant exercise: hence the rapidity with which Carthage prepared her fleets. The accounts in Polybius of the sea-fights in the First Punic War should be carefully studied, especially that with Regulus, in which the Romans adopted the manoeuvre now so well known under the name of "breaking the line." In combined operations, the admiral acted under the commander of the land forces, as in the case of Hamilcar and Hasdrubal (Polyb. ii. 1); but sometimes he took out sealed orders from the senate or the commander-in-chief. (Diod. xiv. 55; Polyaen. v. 10. § 2.) The ships of Carthage were placed under the protection of her sea-deities, whose images seem to have been carved upon the stems. (Sil. Ital. xiv. 572; Munter, pp. 97, foll.)
(2.) Land Forces. — The bulk of the Carthaginian army was composed of their Libyan subjects and of mercenaries, not only from Africa, but from
nearly all the shores of Western Europe. Small, however, as was the purely Punic portion, it deserves particular attention. The chief commands were assigned, of course, to Carthaginian citizens; but, besides this, motives of honour were held out to lead them into the service, each citizen wearing as
many rings as he had served campaigns. (Aristot. Pol. vii. 2. § 6: as Heeren observes, this custom gives significance to Hannibal's message sent to Carthage with the rings of the Roman knights who were slain at Cannae.) It would even seem, if we are to trust Diodorus, that the honour to be reaped from the Sicilian wan moved the citizens of Carthage so strongly, as to lead considerable bodies of them into destruction, and to induce the state to be more sparing of their lives. (Diod. xvi. 70, 71, xix. 106.) The expensive service of the cavalry seems to have had a strong attraction for the higher classes. But, above all, we generally find in a Punic army a
small body of 2500 citizens, called the Sacred Band, chosen for their station, wealth, and courage, and distinguished by the splendour of their arms and by their vessels of gold and silver plate. They appear to have fought on foot, and to have formed the general's body-guard (Diod. xvi. 80, xx. 10, et seq.; Plut. Timol. 27, 28; Polyb. xv. 13.) In the extreme danger of the state, all the citizens formed a Sacred Band, and could furnish an army as formidable for its numbers as for its desperate bravery. The city poured out 40,000 heavy-aimed infantry, with 1000 cavalry and 2000 war-chariots, to meet Agathocles (Appian. Pun. 80); and the desperate defence of the city, at the close of the Third Punic War, showed that the Carthaginians would have made no mean soldiers.
Of their other forces, for the full detail of which our space is inadequate, Heeren has given an admirable account. He remarks the resemblance between the Persian and Carthaginian armies, the former uniting nearly all the nations of the East, and the latter of the West: had their league with Xerxes against Greece succeeded, and had the two armies joined on the soil of Sicily, "they would have presented the remarkable exhibition of a muster of nearly all the varieties of the human species at that time known."(African Nations, vol. i. p. 252.) Polybius ascribes this mixture of peoples to design, that the difference in their languages might be an obstacle to conspiracies and revolt, which, however, when they did occur, were for the same reason the men difficult to allay. (Polyb. i. 67.) The main | dependence was placed on the subject Libyans, who, armed with long lances, formed the bulk of the infantry and heavy cavalry. Next came the Iberians, equipped with white linen vests, and swords fit both to cut or thrust; of whose conspicuous valour many examples occur: and then their rude and savage neighbours, the Gauls, from the Gulf of Lyon, who fought naked, with a sword only made for striking, and were renowned for their perfidy: both peoples served as infantry and cavalry. (Polyb. ii. 7, iii. 114; Liv. xxii. 46; Diod. v. 33.) Besides these, there were Campanian mercenaries, who had deserted the Greeks in the Sicilian wars; Ligurians, who are first mentioned in the Punic Wars; and Greeks, who appear about the same time, and who may have been introduced into the service through the campaigns of Pyrrhus in Sicily. To these must be added two descriptions of force peculiar to the Carthaginian armies; the Balearic slingers, who skirmished in front [Baleares], and the light cavalry of the Nomads, who were levied by deputations sent out by the senate, from the Maurusii near the Pillars of Hercules, to the frontiers of Cyrenaica. Mounted without a saddle on small active horses, so well trained as not to need even the rush halter, which formed their only bridle; equipped with a lion-skin for dress and bed, and a piece of elephant-hide for a shield; rapid alike in the charge, the flight, the rally; they were to the Carthaginians far more than the Cossacks are to the Russians. (Diod. xiii. 80; Strab. xvii. p. 828; Polyb., Liv., passim.) Chariots, derived doubtless from their Phoenician ancestors, were used by the Carthaginians in their wars with Timoleon and Agathocles (Diod. xvi. 80, XX. 10); but they were superseded by the elephants of whom we hear so much in the wars with Rome. Having borrowed from Pyrrhus, as is supposed, the idea of training these beasts to war, they kept up the supply by means of their inland trade with Africa, and also by demanding them as tribute from Rome of the subject cities. A tract of land near the city was set apart for their maintenance; and vaulted chambers were provided in the triple landward wall for 300 elephants and their food. Another row of such chambers contained stables for 4000 horses, and stores for their food; and in the same line of defences there were barracks for 20,000 infantry and 4000 cavalry, besides immense magazines of provisions and military stores. The total force, which Carthage could raise with ease, may be computed at 100,000 men. Though the standing armies of modern states were then unknown, a military force must always have been kept on foot to garrison the city and the foreign possessions; and in both cases these garrisons were composed of mercenaries.
Such was the army of Carthage, equally wanting in consistence and security. The discipline of such a motley host was as difficult as it was necessary; and Livy justly adduces, as one proof of Hannibal's genius, his maintenance of authority over his troops. (Liv. xxviii. 12.) The general results of the system are well summed up by Grote: — "Such men had never any attachment to the cause in which they fought, seldom to the commanders under whom they served; while they were often treated by Carthage with bad faith, and recklessly abandoned to destruction. (Polyb. i. 65—67; Diod. xiv. 75—77.) A military system such as this was pregnant with danger, if ever the mercenary soldiers got footing in Africa; as happened after the First Punic War, when the city was brought to the brink of ruin. But on |
