imperial defence, which led him to seek elsewhere for bonds of union. A statement made in October 1903 throws light on the trend of his political development. Discussing the subject of a federal council he said: ‘The Colonies want to know what it is they are to discuss before they come to your council. When you have got a commercial union, there will be something to discuss. . . . You cannot approach closer union by that means (a federal council). I tried next in connexion with imperial defence. Again I was beaten by the difficulties of the situation; but I did not on that account give it up, and I come back therefore to this idea of commercial union, which will bring us together, which will necessitate the council, which council may in time do much more than it does in the beginning, and may leave us, though it will not find us, a great united, loyal, and federated Empire.’ A little later he declared: ‘I hope to lay firm and deep the foundations for that imperial union which fills my heart when I look forward to the future of the world.’
Welcoming the statement made by an opponent in the press that the real issue in question was between imperialism and ‘Little Englandism’, Chamberlain nailed his colours to the mast as a convinced imperialist (Liverpool, 27 October 1903). He would never have raised the question, as he avowed next day, if he had not been moved by his own personal experiences, and by the responsibilities which he felt he had towards the Colonies. If he had not felt, in connexion with that experience and responsibility, that the whole future of the Empire depended upon a readiness to review the past history, he would have left the subject, so far as if concerned the immediate interests of Great Britain, to younger men. But a constructive policy was essential, and during his long stay at the Colonial Office he had had more opportunities than most men to meet and consult with distinguished colonial statesmen, and he had found that this matter of closer union was much in their thoughts. ‘I found very soon that these men agreed that all progress must be gradual, and that the line of least resistance would be a commercial union on the basis of preference between ourselves and our kinsmen.’ Starting from different premises, he arrived at the same conclusion as Adam Smith, that the British Empire was a potentiality, a project of empire, not an empire—‘a loose bundle of sticks’—bound together by no tie but
that of sentiment and sympathy. In the same speech he spoke of the sacrifices by which the Empire had been created; and a sympathetic critic may regret that more stress was not throughout laid on the necessity of sacrifice for the attainment of great objects. But it must be remembered that Chamberlain was an old campaigner in politics, and if, in the course of his appeal to the British voters, he seemed sometimes to be absorbed in considerations other than those which had launched him on his adventure, he perhaps only followed in the usual steps of the practical politician. Whilst his resignation gave him complete liberty of action, matters were not made easier for him by the hesitating attitude of some of his old colleagues, and especially of the prime minister, Mr. Balfour. Moreover, the ministry had become unpopular by reason of the Education Act of 1902, of which Chamberlain strongly disapproved, though he was too loyal to express his views openly. The effect of all this was to make him concentrate more and more upon the one object, of bringing the British people round to his views of tariff reform. He had, in any case, a difficult task before him. Arrayed against him were the political and economic beliefs of the majority of educated Englishmen; whilst vague memories of ‘the starving ’forties’ made any kind of protection suspect to the labouring classes.
Still, whether we agree or disagree, we must recognize the strength of Chamberlain’s convictions; and it was fitting that the last words in his three years’ campaign, which ended on 9 July 1906, should have been these: ‘The union of the Empire must be preceded and accompanied by a better understanding, by a closer sympathy. To secure that, is the highest object of statesmanship now at the beginning of the twentieth century; and, if these were the last words that I were permitted to utter to you, I would rejoice to utter them in your presence and with your approval. I know that the fruition of our hopes is certain. I hope I may live to congratulate you upon our common triumph; but, in any case, I have faith in the people. I trust in the good sense, the intelligence, and the patriotism of the majority, the vast majority of my countrymen. I look forward to the future with hope and confidence, and
“Others I doubt not, if not we,
The issue of our toil shall see”.’
But it was not given him to see the issue of his toil. Only two days later (11 July),
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