Egypt two mixed divisions and two divisions of cavalry, with four extra brigades of field artillery; to East Africa twelve battalions of infantry with auxiliary services. These were soon followed, for service in France and Egypt, by fifty-two British and Indian battalions and twenty batteries of artillery, to be replaced in India by territorial troops from England; while reinforcements for Aden and British Colonies absorbed nearly 6,000 additional troops from India. Before these demands had been fully met Turkey had entered the War (29 October 1914), and the home government ordered an expedition to be sent to Mesopotamia. By the end of November 1914 a fully equipped Indian division of all arms had been landed, and Basra, the base of future operations, had been captured. To equip so many expeditions India was depleted of her supplies and reserves, and for the replacement of them, especially of medical stores, she was almost entirely dependent on England. But the requirements of the War Office and Admiralty at home left little for India, and with the gradual extension of operations in Mesopotamia it became more and more difficult to keep up the necessary supplies, and the Indian reserves of medical personnel were exhausted.
The home government had enjoined ‘a safe game’ in Mesopotamia. The operations were at first strategically defensive, and the advance halted after successful operations resulting in the occupation of Nazariyeh, Kut el Amara, and Aziziyeh. The possibility of a further advance was, however, discussed in the summer and autumn of 1915. The value of a resounding blow against the Turks to set off against events in the Dardanelles was recognized in England and in India, but all agreed that to capture Bagdad and afterwards to be beaten back would be worse than never to have attacked it. Moreover, to hold it, an additional division, if not two, would be necessary. Duff advised against such an advance as unwise with existing forces, and in a draft telegram to the secretary of state, submitted to the viceroy, Lord Hardinge of Penshurst, he expressed doubt ‘whether in the present state of the river combined with our present insufficient number of light-draught steamers, we could adequately supply our troops there’ [Report, Mesopotamia Commission, pp. 22-3]. This doubt, however, was not communicated by the viceroy to the secretary of state, and the urgent need of greatly increased river transport for any further advance, for the conveyance of supplies and reinforcements, and for the evacuation of sick and wounded, seems never to have been realized by the government in England. In August 1915 a large supply of tugs and barges was ordered from England by the government of India on requisitions from Sir John Nixon [q.v.], commanding in Mesopotamia. These had to be built, and could not arrive in India for many months; but on 23 October the secretary of state telegraphed to the viceroy that Nixon might march on Bagdad if he was satisfied that the force which he had available was sufficient; and it was promised that a reinforcement of two divisions from France should be sent out as soon as possible. The telegram was sent on to Nixon, without comment, by Duff, who, whatever his doubts might be, seems to have considered that, when the government had decided on the advance, it was not for him to interfere with the man on the spot. Sir Charles Townshend, advancing under orders from Nixon, but against his own judgement and with anxious misgivings, met a largely reinforced Turkish army in a prepared position at Ctesiphon, and after severe engagements retreated fighting to Kut el Amara, where, after a gallant defence of nearly five months, he surrendered (29 April 1916). In the conveyance of the very numerous wounded and sick of Townshend’s force, and of the still greater numbers from the forces which successively attempted the relief of Kut el Amara in the face of great difficulties, the hopeless insufficiency of the river transport proved disastrous; it was also impossible to convey up the river large numbers of troops, guns, and supplies, which were waiting at Basra—instalments of the promised reinforcements.
The failure of the attempt on Bagdad, after the brilliant success of the earlier operations, and the reports of the sufferings of the sick and wounded, caused great excitement in England, and a royal commission was appointed in August 1916 to inquire into the origin, inception, and conduct of the operations in Mesopotamia, and the responsibility of the government departments concerned. Duff, who had received the G.C.S.I. in January 1916, was recalled from India in order to give evidence, and in consequence vacated his appointment as commander-in-chief. In December he underwent four days of examination and cross-examination. The commission’s report (17 May 1917) assigned to him a large share of blame, ranking him next after Sir John Nixon
166
