recognized to be his natural successor. He continued to be the commander-in-chief until the spring of 1893. During the seven years in which he was the supreme military authority in India, his chief preoccupation was Russia's advance to the frontier of Afghanistan, and he regarded the threat of the invasion of India by Russia as the chief military problem of the British Empire. He revised the schemes for the defence of the North-West Frontier, and was engaged in a constant struggle to win from the Indian Treasury money for the improvement of communications leading into the Himalaya, and for the provision of adequate transport. He also devoted himself particularly to the improvement of the shooting, both of the infantry and of the artillery, and established a system of field-training which caused the India of his day to be recognized as the most practical school of training for the British army. He was not in agreement with the military reformers at home, and in particular was opposed to the introduction of the short-service system, which, at first, undoubtedly affected the efficiency of the British troops in India. The problems of India required the army to be in a state of instant readiness for war, while a frontier expedition did not involve losses so heavy that they could not be quickly replaced by drafts from home. The need for a reserve was not therefore obvious to one who had passed his military life in India, but later experience caused Roberts to revise his judgement of the reforms which Viscount Cardwell had initiated and Wolseley brought to completion. On 1 January 1892 Roberts was created Baron Roberts, of Kandahar, and early in the following year he left India for good amidst demonstrations of affection and respect such as have rarely been won by a soldier.
In England he had two years to wait for an appointment suited to one of his rank and reputation, and he devoted these to writing his reminiscences. His Forty-one Years in India (1897) is at once a stirring story, simply told, and a demonstration of the generous and frank character of its author. In May 1895 he was made field-marshal, and in the same year he became commander-in-chief in Ireland. In his new command he again set himself to improve the shooting and the field-training of the soldier, while Dublin society was soon convinced that the reputation which he had gained in Simla as a charming host was well deserved.
When, in October 1899, the British government's disputes with the Boers culminated in war, few anticipated a serious campaign requiring the services of a British field-marshal, and Sir Redvers Buller's long experience of South Africa marked him as the leader of the expedition to the Cape. In December the news that Sir George White was shut up in Ladysmith was followed quickly by reports of reverses to Sir William Gatacre at Stormberg, to Lord Methuen at Magersfontein, and to Buller's main force at Colenso. The country was deeply stirred, and heard with relief on 17 December that Mr. Balfour's government had appointed Roberts to the supreme command in South Africa with Lord Kitchener [q.v.] as his chief of staff. Roberts left England in his sixty-eighth year, carrying with him the confidence and affection of his countrymen, as well as their sympathy for the loss of his only son, Lieutenant Frederick Roberts, mortally wounded a few days before in a gallant attempt to save some of Buller's guns at Colenso. Lieutenant Roberts died before the Victoria cross, for which he had been recommended, could be awarded him.
Up to the time of Lord Roberts's arrival at the Cape (10 January) two fundamental mistakes had been made in the conduct of the campaign. Reliance had been placed mainly upon the British infantry, and offers of mounted troops both from South Africa and from the Dominions were treated coldly; the consequent lack of mobility in dealing with enemy forces in which every man was mounted was a fatal handicap. Further, the provision of transport was so limited as to tie the lines of advance to the few railways. This indicated clearly to the Boers the general nature of the British plan. Roberts at once encouraged local levies of mounted men, greatly increased the number of mounted infantry, and, profiting by his long experience of transport difficulties in India, with the help of Kitchener completely remodelled the transport system. He also saw at once that the situation demanded the earliest possible invasion of the Free State from the Cape Colony, and, while reinforcements from England were on the way to him, prepared his plans with the utmost secrecy. To these plans he resolutely adhered, despite urgent calls for relief from Kimberley, the failure of Buller's third attempt to relieve Ladysmith and his despairing suggestion that he should abandon it, despite also the first flicker of revolt in Cape Colony. Disposing his troops so
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