in opposition to a Kruger candidate. In the volksraad he distinguished himself as a supporter of Joubert’s liberal views on the Uitlander franchise, and vigorously opposed the corrupt concessions of the Kruger régime, especially the Pretoria water concession and the dynamite monopoly, which he was called upon to investigate as a member of the volksraad committee. But though against the president’s policy, and one of the minority of seven who voted against the ultimatum of 9 October 1899, he cast all doubts aside when war was declared (11 October 1899), and went off to muster his commando at Vryheid.
The war soon proved the mettle of this quiet, wise man. As a simple field-cornet he accompanied Lukas Meyer’s commandos for the invasion of Natal, but from the outset showed a dash and an understanding of aggressive action which brought him to the front. He led the first reconnoitring party across the Buffalo river, distinguished himself at the battle of Dundee, and on 30 October, when Lukas Meyer fell sick, was promoted to be assistant-general. Shortly afterwards he was put in command of the southern force investing Ladysmith. But Botha was not content to sit quietly before Ladysmith; with some of the other younger Boers he was always pressing Joubert, the commander-in-chief, to push on and possibly even reach the sea before the British reinforcements arrived. Thus urged, Joubert crossed the Tugela in November, sweeping round Estcourt with two columns, and during this advance Botha ambushed an armoured train near Chievely and took prisoner Mr. Winston Churchill. However, as British reinforcements began to arrive, Joubert re-crossed the river, and, being invalided himself, left Botha in command of the Tugela defences. Sir Redvers Buller [q.v.], on taking over command of the British forces in Natal at the end of November, decided to reach Ladysmith by a frontal attack on the Boer centre opposite Colenso. Botha, with that rare instinct for reading his opponent’s mind, one of his most remarkable characteristics as a general, divined that Buller would choose this course and, weakening his widely extended flanks, concentrated nearly all his strength on his centre. In this position, on a semi-circle of hills north of the Tugela, he had dug himseif in so securely and so imperceptibly that the advancing British troops were at his mercy. To make assurance doubly sure he gave orders that not a shot should be fired by his men until the enemy were actually crossing the Tugela. The Boers, however, when the British guns under Colonel Charles James Long came forward into action in an exposed position just south of the Tugela, could no longer restrain themselves and, besides putting the battery out of action, so clearly revealed the enormous strength of their position that Buller gave up his intended frontal attack.
Botha seems at once to have realized the crushing effect of this reverse on Buller, and once more urged an immediate advance, but he was overruled by the elder Boers. Unfortunately for the Boer people Botha was not yet master of their military decisions, and the Boer force facing Buller was divided into independent commands with no single general supreme. However, when it came to actual fighting, Botha’s clear vision and practical resource enabled him to impose his will on his colleagues. At Tabanyama, his prompt call for volunteers saved the Boer right flank. Again, when the British force had climbed Spion Kop on 24 January 1900 and many of the burghers had begun a panic-stricken retreat, Botha brought up guns to shell the British detachment, rallied his men, and directed the succession of counter-attacks which finally dislodged the British. He showed once more the same spirit during the last desperate fighting before Ladysmith in February, when Buller was working round on the eastern flank. At Vaalkrantz his energy forced Buller to retire, though it could not induce his burghers to follow up the success; and though for a moment he despaired as the British advanced, he soon returned to his normal attitude and telegraphed to Kruger after a Boer success, ‘With the help of the Lord, I expect that if only the spirit of the burghers keeps up as it did to-day, the enemy will suffer a great reverse. But in the last stage Botha was constantly hampered by Meyer, who had returned to the field and was in nominal command; and after Pieter’s Hill (27 February) his attempts to rally the burghers for one more stand were frustrated by Joubert himself, who gave the signal for a general retreat.
On the day of Pieter’s Hill General Piet Cronje surrendered at Paardeberg, and a month later Joubert died, whereupon Botha, the most prominent of the young, eager, and capable Boers, was promoted to be commandant-general of the Transvaal. He at once began to infuse new energy into the fighting forces of his countrymen. He sent a peremptory
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