great gift of piercing to the core of a problem when the facts had been presented to him, and it would have been almost as true to say of him as of Chatham: ‘The first time I come to him about any matter I find him extremely ignorant; the second time I come to him I find him completely informed upon it.’ He had also the gift of inspiring confidence, largely because he himself had so generous a belief and love for his fellow men, and thereby drew out the best from all with whom he was thrown into contact; but with this gentle quality he had the power of hitting hard when necessary, and no one took liberties with him twice.
At the Union Convention the determination of Botha and the Transvaal delegation to make a real union and not merely a loose confederation carried the day. As Sir George Herbert Farrar, one of the English delegates, said, ‘British and Boer had been brought together by the wise and tolerant action of General Botha and General Smuts, and to-day they stood together asking to join in a union of South Africa.’ This tendency was marvellously strengthened by the alliance struck up at the Convention between Botha and Dr. Jameson, whom Botha had once wanted to shoot. Both instinctively felt that they were struggling towards the same end—the reconciliation of the races on the common ground of their interest in South Africa. Botha had not always an easy task with some of his own countrymen during the discussions, and even when the language and the native questions had been settled satisfactorily to Boer aspirations, the question of the capital might have wrecked everything had not Botha finally taken aside the Transvaal supporters of Pretoria, and appealing to the trust reposed in their statesmanship by King Edward and the British people, persuaded them to accept the compromise of two capitals.
Botha was chosen as first prime minister of the Union of South Africa (10 May 1910) and held that office till his death. He and Jameson had discussed the feasibility of a coalition ministry of their two parties; but it was found impossible, and Botha formed a purely party ministry. Yet when the care of all South Africa was committed to him he had no more idea of governing solely in the interests of the Dutch section than before in the Transvaal. When his colleague, General J. B. M. Hertzog, went about the country stirring up strife by his speeches against the British element of the population and Botha’s proposals for naval defence, Botha re-formed his ministry in December 1912, excluding Hertzog, and in the following year won a striking victory over him and his ally, De Wet, at the congress of the South African party. The two most serious difficulties with which Botha’s ministry had to deal before the European War were the question of Indian immigrants and the unrest on the Rand. Indians originally brought to Natal as indentured labourers claimed the right, through their spokesman, M. K. Gandhi, to settle in the country as citizens when their periods of indenture were completed. Smuts, who took over the chief management of this question, had some difficult passages with the able Indian leader, and also had to deal with the opposition of the Indian government; but a satisfactory compromise was reached in 1914, and Gandhi returned to his own country, declaring himself satisfied. The unrest on the Rand was an even more serious matter. In July 1913 there was a general strike of the white miners and considerable fear of a native rising also; while, owing to the pending reorganization of the Union forces, imperial troops alone were available. After a collision between them and the Johannesburg mob, Botha and Smuts, much against their will, felt bound to sign an inconclusive agreement with the strikers; and in the following January another still more serious strike paralysed the railways. This time Botha and Smuts were well prepared. Martial law was proclaimed, the burgher force to the number of 60,000 was called out, nine of the labour leaders were seized and deported from the country without trial, and the strike collapsed. These drastic and arbitrary measures, and especially the deportations, aroused much criticism both in England and in South Africa. But the South African parliament was satisfied that the right course had been taken, if not in the best way, and passed the Indemnity Act brought in by the government.
On the declaration of war against Germany in August 1914, many of the Dutch who followed the banner of Hertzog were disposed to take up the attitude that it was none of their business, and that South Africa should remain neutral. But Botha never had any hesitation as to the right course to pursue. He at once suggested to the imperial government that, as they needed all their troops in Europe, the imperial garrison should be withdrawn from South Africa and the Union left to look after its own defence.
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