cabin for many days together.’ A milder climate might, he thought, give him relief. For the next three years he was employed principally in the Levant and in convoy service within the Straits, and returned home to pay off in April 1763. In the following September he was appointed to the Thunderer guardship at Portsmouth, in which in the summer of 1765 he carried a regiment of foot soldiers to North America. In April 1767 he was appointed commander-in-chief in North America, with a broad pennant on board the Romney. On his return he commanded the Royal William guardship at Portsmouth from January 1771 to November 1773, and the Marlborough to July 1776. On 5 July, through the carelessness of the gunner when clearing the ship to go into dock, a quantity of powder left in the fore magazine was exploded. The fore part of the ship was wrecked, some eighteen people (men, women, and children) were killed, and fifty wounded. Hood, with the officers and crew, was turned over to the Courageux.
In January 1778 he was appointed commissioner at Portsmouth and governor of the Naval Academy. The acceptance of these offices was ordinarily considered as retiring from the active service; still more so perhaps in the case of Hood, when on the occasion of the king's visit to Portsmouth in the following May he was created a baronet. There was therefore some surprise felt in the navy when, on 26 Sept. 1780, he was promoted to the rank of rear-admiral of the blue, and appointed to the command of a strong squadron sent out in December to reinforce Sir George Rodney in the West Indies. The probable explanation is that in the lamentable state to which the maladministration of Lord Sandwich and the scandals of the Keppel and Palliser courts-martial had reduced the navy, competent admirals willing to serve were very difficult to find, and the admiralty were glad to secure the services of a man of good repute whose political principles were at least not antagonistic, and who from his early association might be trusted to co-operate loyally with his commander-in-chief. Hood's abilities and high character had not at that time manifested themselves in any remarkable degree.
Hood, with his squadron, joined Rodney at St. Lucia in time to take part in the expedition (30 Jan. 1781) against St. Eustatius, after which he was sent with a strong force to blockade Martinique. On this operation Rodney laid great stress; and, though Hood from time to time anxiously represented that if the expected fleet should arrive from France his position to leeward of the island would render it impossible for him to enforce the blockade and might expose him to great danger, Rodney refused to be convinced, or to believe in the rumours of the French fleet's coming (Mundy, ii. 82–6). Hood's forecast was, however, correct. On the morning of 29 April a fleet of twenty ships of the line, under Count de Grasse, slipped round the southern end of the island and effected a junction with the four ships at Fort Royal. Hood, who had with him only eighteen sail of the line, and had fallen some little distance to leeward during the night, was thus placed at a serious disadvantage. A partial action ensued, in which four of Hood's ships suffered much damage, and he was compelled to draw back. The fleets remained in presence of each other for two more days, when De Grasse, who was as timid as a tactician as he showed himself bold as a strategist, retired into Fort Royal, leaving the way clear for Hood to join Rodney at Antigua, and to take part with him in the various incidents of the campaign. As the hurricane months approached, and the season for active operations in the West Indies came to an end, Rodney, whose health was in a very precarious state, sailed for England, directing Hood to take as many of the ships as were available to reinforce Rear-admiral Graves [see Graves, Thomas, Lord Graves] on the coast of North America. He joined Graves at New York on 28 Aug., but with only fourteen ships, some, scarcely seaworthy, having gone home with Rodney, and others having been sent to Jamaica to refit. Neither Graves, nor Rodney, nor Hood seems, indeed, to have realised the very critical position of affairs, nor to have had any conception of the magnitude of the effort which the French were making to obtain the command of the sea. On 5 Sept. the English fleet of nineteen ships found itself off the Chesapeake opposed to a French fleet of twenty-four, with four still remaining inside to continue the blockade, and seven more, under De Barras, on their way from Rhode Island. In the battle which followed, Hood commanded the rear of the English line and never got into action, the stress of the fighting falling entirely on the van, which was roughly handled. He received a full share of the popular abuse which, after the unfortunate event, was lavished on every one concerned; it was hinted that he was ‘shy,’ and had shamefully kept aloof while the van was being overpowered. The fact was that he, with his division, was running down before the wind in obedience to the signal for close action, when he was checked by the signal for ‘the line of battle ahead’ repeated and enforced. To keep the line and at the same time to engage closely was an impossi-
