number escaped with little or no damage, and were at sea in the course of the following summer. By popular opinion Hood was blamed for these disasters and miscarriages; all, it was argued, might have been prevented by timely care and forethought. But the embarrassment of the dual command and of diverse nationalities cannot be ignored. Both the Toulonese and the Spaniards were averse to the destruction of the ships or to their being sent to an English port. The Spaniards wished them to be sent to a Spanish port, but this Hood refused to allow; and thus amid conflicting jealousies the weeks slipped away till it was too late.
For some time previous Hood had been in communication with Paoli, the leader of the Corsicans in revolt against France, and now on the fall of Toulon he resolved to secure the island, if only as a base of operations. A close blockade had already been kept up for several weeks. After a sharp encounter between the Fortitude and a martello tower defending the entrance of the bay of S. Fiorenzo, the tower was captured from the land side by the English troops, and S. Fiorenzo was taken without further opposition on 17 Feb. 1794. Hood now wished to attack Bastia, but the general in command of the troops refused to co-operate before the arrival of reinforcements. The enemy, however, were adding each day to the strength of their position; and Hood, judging that no time should be lost, laid siege to it on 4 April with the small forces at his disposal for land service, some 1,200 marines, or soldiers borne in lieu of marines, under the command of Lieutenant-colonel Villettes, and 250 seamen, under Nelson, then captain of the Agamemnon [see Nelson, Horatio, Viscount Nelson], he himself keeping up a close blockade by sea. The place capitulated on 19 May. Nelson, somewhat ignoring the co-operation of the fleet, the moral effect of which must have been considerable, independently of the rigorous blockade which it enforced, wrote to his brother on 30 May: ‘All has been done by seamen and troops embarked to serve as marines, except a few artillery under the orders of Lord Hood, who has given in this instance a most astonishing proof of the vigour of his mind and of his zeal and judgment. … Four thousand five hundred men have laid down their arms to under 1,200 troops and seamen; it is such an event as is hardly on record.’ On 9 June the Dido frigate came in with intelligence that the enemy's fleet was at sea. Sorely against his will, Rear-admiral Martin had been compelled by the Convention to sail. He had vainly represented that he had only about half the number of ships that the English had, not to speak of the Spanish fleet, numerically as strong as the English; he knew also that his men were untrained and undisciplined, that his officers were ignorant, and that the courage or enthusiasm on which the Convention depended was no sufficient substitute for skill, discipline, and numbers. He was ordered to take on board furnaces for heating shot, shells, and carcasses, to seek for the English fleet, and forthwith destroy it. In accordance with his orders he put to sea on 6 June, but when out of reach of the Convention determined that his proper course was to preserve the fleet, and therefore not to venture far from the Lérins Islands, which he judged might afford him refuge. On the 12th, when the English came in sight, he at once stood in and anchored in Golfe Jouan. Hood, with a force vastly superior in point of numbers and still more in efficiency, ordered an immediate attack. So far as the numbers went, two English ships were to anchor alongside each French ship and make themselves masters of her. Unfortunately the wind died away, and during the next few days a dead calm was broken only by fitful breezes from opposing quarters. Martin meanwhile took the opportunity of strengthening his position, landing guns, throwing up batteries, and converting small coasting vessels into gunboats. When at last the wind blew fair for the roadstead, Hood judged that the attack was no longer feasible; and, leaving the greater part of the fleet under Vice-admiral Hotham to maintain the blockade, he returned to Corsica, where the siege of Calvi was already in progress. This, the last stronghold of the French, surrendered on 10 Aug., and the whole island submitted to the English.
Hood, whose promotion on 12 April to the rank of admiral had reached him shortly before, was soon afterwards recalled. It was pretended that his health was failing and that he had desired to be relieved; but it seems to have been generally understood that it was rather on account of a difference of opinion with the admiralty or the ministry. Nelson ascribed it to some contemptible intrigue. Hood sailed for England on 11 Oct., leaving the command with Hotham [see Hotham, William, Lord]. This was spoken of as merely a temporary arrangement, and the news of his final resignation called forth a fresh burst of Nelson's indignation. ‘The fleet (Nelson wrote) must regret the loss of Lord Hood, the best officer, take him altogether, that England has to boast of; great in all situations which an admiral can be placed in’ (8, 22 June 1795).
