been laid down by the admiralty as a positive order that when the fleet was to windward of the enemy ranged in line of battle, the van was to engage the van, and so on the whole length of the line. For a violation of this order Mathews had been cashiered; for not giving effect to it Byng had been shot; by attempting it in 1781 Graves was defeated and the American colonies were lost. Rodney was keenly alive to the absurdity of it, and risked departure from it. Two days before he had acquainted each captain in the fleet that it was his intention to bring the whole force of his fleet on a part—perhaps two-thirds—of the enemy's (Sir Gilbert Blane in Athenæum, 1809, a monthly magazine, v. 302); so that when, early in the morning of the 17th, he made the signal that he intended to attack the enemy's rear, he took for granted that his meaning was patent to every one. Unfortunately several signals and manœuvres intervened, and both fleets were on the same tack, heading to the north, when, a few minutes before noon, the order to engage was finally given. By that time the rear-admiral and captains in the van had quite forgotten both the earlier signal and the communication made two days before, which they probably never understood. The result was a grievous disappointment. Rodney felt that he had Guichen in his grasp. The French fleet was in very open order; their line extended to something like twelve miles; and he had thus the chance of falling, with his whole force, on half of that of the enemy. But Captain Robert Carkett [q. v.], who commanded the leading ship, and Rear-admiral Hyde Parker (1714–1782) [q. v.], who commanded the van, could not understand anything beyond the fatal ‘instruction,’ and stretched ahead to seek the enemy's van. Others followed their example; and others, again, between the contradictory signals of Rodney and Parker, were completely puzzled, and did nothing. There followed a partial engagement, in which several of the ships on either side were much shattered, in which many men were killed or wounded, but in which no advantage was obtained by either party.
In his letter to the admiralty Rodney laid the blame for the failure on several of the captains, and especially on Carkett. But the responsibility was largely his in not making it clear to at least the junior flag-officers that he proposed attempting something distinctly contrary to the admiralty fighting instructions. Guichen, on his part, was quick to realise that, with an enemy who refused to be bound by office formulæ, the lee gage might be a position of unwonted danger; and accordingly, a month later, when the fleets were again in presence of each other, to windward of Martinique, he obstinately retained the weather-gage which fortune gave him; and thus, though on two separate occasions, 15 and 19 May, Rodney, aided by a shift of wind, was able to lay up to his rear and bring on a passing skirmish, no battle took place. And so the campaign ended. A couple of months later Guichen returned to Europe, while Rodney, doubtful if he had not gone to the coast of North America, went himself to join Vice-admiral Arbuthnot at New York. There Arbuthnot received him with insolence and insubordination. Rodney behaved with moderation, but as Arbuthnot refused to be conciliated, he referred the matter to the admiralty [see Arbuthnot, Marriott]; and, having satisfied himself that he was no longer needed in North American waters, he returned to the West Indies, where he arrived in the beginning of December.
By the end of the month he was joined by Sir Samuel (afterwards Viscount) Hood [q. v.] with a large reinforcement, and a few weeks later, on 27 Jan. 1781, he received news of the war with Holland, and a recommendation to attack St. Eustatius. This coincided with Rodney's own wishes. The contraband and partial trade of St. Eustatius had been an annoyance and grievance to him during the whole of the past year, and he eagerly grasped the opportunity of vengeance. He seized the island and its accumulation of merchandise, to the value of from two to three millions sterling. This enormous mass of wealth seems to have intoxicated him. A large proportion of it belonged to English merchants, and against these Rodney was especially furious; they were traitors who had been gathering riches by supplying the enemies of their country with contraband of war. ‘My happiness,’ he wrote to Germain, ‘is having been the instrument of my country in bringing this nest of villains to condign punishment. They deserve scourging, and they shall be scourged.’ Unfortunately, he did not consider that, as the offenders claimed to be Englishmen, the scourging must be by legal process. He confiscated the whole of the property, sold some of it by auction, and sent a large part of the remainder for England. But as the convoy approached the shores of Europe it fell into the hands of a French squadron under Lamotte Picquet, who captured a great part of it [see Hotham, William, Lord]; and St. Eustatius itself, with the rest of the booty, including the money realised by the sales, was afterwards recaptured by De
