for the second China war. It had already been censured in the lords by a majority of thirty-six. A technical flaw in the registration of the Arrow gave a handle for argument to those who, ignorant of our position in China and regardless of a long series of breaches of treaty and of humiliations, insults, and outrages upon British subjects, saw merely an opportunity for making party capital or airing a vapid philanthropy which was seldom less appropriate. Palmerston might have sheltered himself behind the fact that the war had been begun by Sir John Bowring in the urgency of the moment, without consulting the home government; but he never deserted his officers in a just cause, and the case in dispute fitted closely with his own policy. His instructions to Sir John Davis, on 9 Jan. 1847, which were familiar to Bowring and Parkes, fully covered the emergency: ‘We shall lose,’ he wrote, ‘all the vantage-ground we have gained by our victories in China if we take a low tone. … Depend upon it, that the best way of keeping any men quiet is to let them see that you are able and determined to repel force by force; and the Chinese are not in the least different, in this respect, from the rest of mankind’ (Parl. Papers, 1847, 184, p. 2; Lane-Poole, Life of Sir Harry Parkes, i. 216–37). No foreign secretary was so keenly alive to the importance of British interests in China, so thoroughly conversant with conditions of diplomacy in the Far East, or so firm in carrying out a wise and consistent policy. He accepted his parliamentary defeat very calmly, and, after finishing necessary business, appealed to the country. No man could feel the popular pulse more accurately, and the result of the general election was never doubtful. It was essentially a personal election, and the country voted for ‘old Pam’ with overwhelming enthusiusm. That ‘fortuitous concourse of atoms,’ the opposition, was scattered to the winds; Cobden, Bright, and Milner Gibson lost their seats, and the peace party was temporarily annihilated. In April the government returned to power with a largely increased majority (366 liberals, 287 conservatives).
Meanwhile the Indian mutiny had broken out. At first Palmerston, like most of the authorities, was disposed to underrate its seriousness, but his measures for the relief of the overmatched British garrison of India and the suppression of the rebellion were prompt and energetic. He sent out Sir Colin Campbell at once, and by the end of September eighty ships had sailed for India, carrying thirty thousand troops. Foreign powers proffered assistance, but Palmerston replied that England must show that she was able to put down her own rebellions ‘off her own bat’ (Ashley, l.c. ii. 351). When this was accomplished, he brought in (12 Feb. 1858) the bill to transfer the dominions of the East India Company to the crown, and carried the first reading by a majority of 145. A week after this triumphant majority the government was beaten by nineteen on the second reading of the conspiracy to murder bill (by which, in view of Orsini's attempt on the life of Napoleon III, conspiracy to murder was to be made a felony). The division was a complete surprise, chiefly due to bad management of the whips. Palmerston at once resigned, and was succeeded by Lord Derby. The new ministry was in a minority, and, being beaten on a reform bill early in 1859, dissolved parliament. The election, however, left them still to the bad, and after Lord Derby had for the fourth time tried to induce the popular ex-premier to join him, he was defeated on 10 June, and resigned.
Embarrassed by the difficulty of choosing between the two veterans, Palmerston and Russell, the queen sent for Lord Granville, who found it impossible to form a cabinet, though Palmerston generously consented to join his junior. The country looked to ‘Pam,’ and him only, as its leader, and at the age of seventy-five he formed his second administration (30 June 1859), with a very strong cabinet, including Russell, Gladstone, Cornewall Lewis, Granville, Cardwell, Wood, Sidney Herbert, and Milner Gibson. His interval of leisure while out of office had enabled him to resume his old alliance with those who had opposed him on the Crimean and China wars. It was one of Palmerston's finest traits of character that he never bore malice. When Guizot was banished from France in 1848 Palmerston had him to dinner at once, old foe as he was, and they nearly ‘shook their arms off’ in their hearty reconciliation (Greville, Journal, pt. ii. vol. iii. p. 157). ‘He was always a very generous enemy,’ said dying Cobden. When Granville supplanted Palmerston at the foreign office in 1851, he met with a cheery greeting and offers of help. When Russell threw him over, he called him laughingly ‘a foolish fellow,’ and bore him no personal grudge. So in 1859 he brought them all together again. His six remaining years were marked by peaceful tranquillity both in home and foreign affairs. Italy and France indeed presented problems of some complexity, but these were met with prudence and skill. Palmerston and his foreign minister, Lord John Russell, now
