Page:Dictionary of National Biography volume 60.djvu/372

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Weston
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Weston

held; but of the ministers who surrounded Charles, Weston obtained the largest share in his confidence, and the greatest influence in the conduct of affairs. The result was at once apparent. Weston was an advocate of peace at any price, and of complete abstention from foreign complications; not because peace was in itself desirable, but because war and a spirited foreign policy required money, and money could only be obtained from parliaments which were apt to prove insubordinate. During peace men were more likely to become rich through commercial development, and, being rich, would be more subservient to the king (cf. Ranke, v. 446). War, moreover, would only be waged against Spain, and Weston's pro-Spanish proclivities were as marked as his devotion to peace. The same desire to avoid or postpone difficulties—‘quieta non movere’—actuated Weston's domestic policy. It was on his introduction that Wentworth was taken into favour and made a peer, and it was he who dissuaded Charles from erecting a monument to Buckingham, partly from fear of popular resentment and partly because he had no money to spare. In November he announced that the question of tunnage and poundage should be left to parliament, and for some time, under his advice, Charles acted with considerable tact and skill. Weston's own unpopularity was, however, scarcely less than Buckingham's, and ‘dread of assassination haunted him to the last’ (Gardiner, vii. 128). On 2 March 1628–9 Eliot denounced him in the commons as the prime agent of iniquity, accused him of ‘building upon the old grounds and foundations which were built upon by the Duke of Buckingham, his great master,’ and called for his impeachment. Weston naturally urged the dissolution of parliament, which was not to meet again for eleven years, and probably also the imprisonment of Eliot and the other members. His unpopularity, due partly to the fact that office and power changed his cringing subservience into overbearing rudeness, was mainly owing to a well-founded suspicion that he was at heart a Roman catholic. This did not save him from the hostility of Henrietta Maria, whose lavish demands upon the exchequer he refused to meet; and court intrigues similar to those against Richelieu threatened Weston and led to an understanding between the French and English ministers; but, like Richelieu, Weston could in the last resort rely upon the support of his king.

It was this support that enabled Weston to carry out his pacific policy in face of opposition at court and in the council. In October 1628 he urged the acceptance of Contarini's offer of mediation between France and England, and dissuaded Charles from sending aid to Denmark. In July 1629 he told the king that he would have to summon another parliament unless peace were made with Spain, and he and Cottington were selected to confer, unknown to the rest of the council, with Rubens for that object; Cottington was then sent ambassador to Spain, and Weston's old friend Coloma came as Spanish ambassador to England. As a result of these efforts peace was concluded with Spain in December 1630. This peace was highly unpopular; in Massinger's ‘Believe as you List,’ which was refused license on 11 Jan. 1630–1 as containing dangerous matter, the dramatist denounces ‘the mastery which Weston himself—seduced, as it was alleged, by the gold of the Spanish ambassador—exercised over the mind of the king,’ and similar views were expressed in Massinger's ‘Maid of Honour,’ produced in 1632 (see S. R. Gardiner in Contemporary Review, xxviii. 495 sqq.) The victories of Gustavus Adolphus inflamed popular zeal for intervention on behalf of the protestants on the continent, and for a time Weston was compelled to bow before the storm. Charles I offered aid to Gustavus, but his conditions were such as to ensure the rejection of the offer by the Swedish king, and his death at Lutzen afforded Charles and his minister a welcome pretext for abandoning all thoughts of active participation in the war.

On 17 Feb. 1632–3 Charles conferred on Weston a fresh mark of confidence by creating him Earl of Portland, but in 1634 a formidable attack was made on him. Laud and Coventry denounced his greed, and he was accused of extensive malpractices. Wentworth, too, complained from Ireland that Portland never answered his letters, and threatened to resign. But again Portland was victorious; his son-in-law, the Duke of Lennox, brought up Buckingham's widow to plead on his behalf, and Charles once more gave the lord treasurer his support. The two were in the same year engaged in a plot to hoodwink the council and assist Spain in defeating the advance of France and the Dutch on the Spanish Netherlands, which was thought to threaten Dunkirk and England's supremacy in the narrow seas. To furnish a fleet for this purpose ship-money was first revived, and on this occasion also Charles claimed the sovereignty of the seas. Portland's own interest in the matter was stimulated by his connection with the fishing company, fishing being then almost a Dutch monopoly. A secret treaty was signed with Spain in