land, the garrison they had left in Carlisle surrendered on the 30th, and on 2 Jan. the duke set out for London, where it was at that time believed that a French invasion from Dunkirk was imminent. It was left to Wade's army, or rather to the English part of it, now under Hawley's command, to follow up the rebels, whose numbers had been raised by reinforcements to nine thousand. They had undertaken the siege of Stirling Castle. Hawley marched from Edinburgh to raise the siege, and on 17 Jan. was beaten at Falkirk [see Hawley, Henry].
The duke was at once sent north to replace him. On the 28th Horace Walpole wrote: ‘The great dependence is upon the duke; the soldiers adore him, and with reason; he has a lion's courage, vast vigilance and activity, and, I am told, great military genius’ (Letters, ii. 4). He reached Edinburgh on the 30th, and next day the army, somewhat reinforced, was again on the march for Stirling. The rebels did not wait for him. Charles Edward was forced, much against his will, to raise the siege and retire to the highlands. The duke entered Stirling on 2 Feb. and Perth on the 6th. On the 8th a corps of five thousand Hessians, sent to replace the Dutch troops, arrived at Leith. They were placed at Perth and Stirling to guard the southern issues from the highlands; and on the 20th the duke set out with his army for Aberdeen, which he reached on the 28th. On his way he issued a proclamation at Montrose on the 24th, summoning all concerned in the rebellion to submit and deliver up their arms.
The army remained nearly six weeks at Aberdeen, inactive except for outpost affairs, but collecting supplies. At length the weather allowed it, on 8 April, to move on Inverness. The Spey was passed on the 12th, and on the 15th, the duke's birthday, there was a day's halt at Nairn. The rebel army was assembled on Drumossie Moor, near Culloden House, five miles east of Inverness; and its leaders seized the opportunity for a night surprise. But the march took longer than they expected, the attempt was abandoned, and the rebels returned to their position on the moor, weary and disheartened. The English soon followed them, and about 1 P.M. on 16 April the battle of Culloden began.
The duke's army consisted of three regiments of horse, fifteen battalions of foot (eight of which had fought at Fontenoy) and about fifteen hundred highlanders, in all about 8,800 men with eighteen guns (Scots Magazine, 1746, p. 216). The force was little larger than at Falkirk, but it was much better handled. Hawley had attacked with his cavalry, which was driven back upon his foot; the duke used his cavalry to cover his own flanks and threaten those of the enemy. Hawley had left his guns behind; the duke's guns were distributed by pairs between the infantry battalions, and their fire so galled the highlanders as to provoke them to charge piecemeal without waiting for orders. Battalions opportunely brought up from the second line and reserve prolonged the first line, and took the highlanders in flank as they charged. This time the English infantry had the wind at their backs, and the men had been told each to use his bayonet, in hand-to-hand fighting, not against his own assailant, who could parry it with his target, but against the assailant of his right-hand man.
According to Patullo, the muster-master of the rebel army, it numbered above eight thousand on the rolls, but there were so many absentees that it was not possible to bring five thousand to the field (Home, p. 333). Lord George Murray (1700–1760) [q. v.] reckoned it as not above seven thousand fighting men, of whom only 150 were horse. The right wing and centre of the highlanders charged first, and had some success. They broke through the interval between the two regiments on the left of the first line, capturing the two guns there for a time, and killing or wounding 207 men in those two regiments. But they were repulsed by the second line, and scattered by the dragoons. ‘The left wing did not attack the enemy, at least did not go in sword in hand, imagining they would be flanked by a regiment of foot and some horse which the enemy brought up at that time’ (Lockhart Papers, p. 531. The letter is unsigned, but was written by Lord George Murray, see Athole MSS. Hist. MSS. Comm. 12th Rep. App. viii. 74, and Home, p. 359). The discontent of the Macdonalds at being placed on the left may have cooled their ardour, but that they ‘stood moody, motionless, and irresolute to fight’ (Stanhope, iii. 306) is contradicted by several witnesses. The duke himself wrote: ‘Upon the right, where I had placed myself, imagining the greatest push would be there, they came down three several times within a hundred yards of our men, firing their pistols and brandishing their swords, but the Royals and Pulteney's hardly took their firelocks from their shoulders, so that after those faint attempts they made off’ (Weston Papers, p. 443; cf. Johnstone, pp. 144, 159, and Maxwell's narrative).
The battle was decided in less than half
