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The Literature of International Relations
be formed, and this general connection must be partially overturned by every change. In this manner the whole relations of all states to each other serve rather to preserve the stability of the whole than to produce changes; that is to say, this tendency to stability exists in general. This we conceive to be the true notion of a balance of power, and in this sense it will always of itself come into existence, whenever there are extensive connections between civilised states. How far this tendency of the general interests to the maintenance of the existing state of things is efficient is another question; at all events we can conceive some changes in the relations of single states to each other, which promote this efficiency of the whole, and others which obstruct it. … The defensive, in general, may count more on foreign aid than the offensive; he may reckon the more certainly on it in proportion as his existence is of importance to others, that is to say, the sounder and more vigorous his political and military condition.'[1]

Influence of the political object on the military:

'Even in wars carried on without allies, the political cause of a war has a great influence upon the method in which it is conducted. … The reciprocal action, the rivalry, the violence and impetuosity of war lose themselves in the stagnation of weak motives, and … both parties move with a certain kind of security in very circumscribed spheres. If this influence of the political object is once permitted, as it then must be, there is no longer any limit, and we must be prepared to come down to such warfare as consists in a mere threatening of the enemy and in negotiating. That the theory of war, if it is to be and continue a philosophical study, finds itself here in
  1. Clausewitz, On War, ii, pp. 81–3. Cf.: 'When a great state which has smaller allies is conquered, these usually secede very soon from their alliance, so that the victor, in this respect, with every blow becomes stronger; but if the conquered state is small, protectors must sooner present themselves when his very existence is threatened, and others, who have helped to place him in his present embarrassment, will turn round to prevent his complete downfall.' Ibid., iii, p. 37.