reason; it is of Adam said that amongst the beastes He found not for him selfe any meete companion.[1] Civill society doth more content the nature of man then any private kind of solitarie living, because in societie this good of mutuall participation is so much larger then otherwise. Herewith notwithstanding we are not satisfied, but we covet (if it might be) to have a kind of societie & fellowship even with al mãkind. Which thing Socrates intending to signifie professed him self a Citizen, not of this or that cõmon-welth, but of the world.[2] And an effect of that very natural desire in us, (a manifest token that we wish after a sort an universall fellowship with all men) appeareth by the wounderful delight men have, some to visit forrein countries, some to discover natiõs not heard of in former ages, we all to know the affaires & dealings of other people, yea to be in league of amitie with them; & this not onely for trafiques sake, or to the end that when many are cõfederated each may make other the more strong, but for such cause also is[3] moved the Queene of Saba to visit Salomon;[4] & in a word because nature doth presume that how many mẽ there are in the world, so many Gods as it were ther are, or at least wise such they should be towards men. Touching lawes which are to serve men in this behalfe, even as those lawes of reason which (man retayning his original integritie) had bene sufficient to direct each particular person in all his affaires & duties, are not sufficient but require the accesse of other lawes, now that man and his offspring are growne thus corrupt and sinfull; againe as those lawes of politie & regiment, which would have served men living in publique societie together with that harmlesse disposition which then they should have had, are
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The Literature of International Relations
