I have always regarded an alliance with one of the great powers as essential, because I felt that the independence which we preserved towards these powers put us at a disadvantage and created too much matter for controversy. Personally, I always supported an alliance with England. When the Kaiser was in Vienna, after the annexation of Bosnia, I had a conversation with him after the dinner at court, during which I mentioned that, having barely escaped the danger of war, it would be highly desirable to improve our relations with England, in order to avoid a repetition of the same danger. The German Kaiser, however, broke off the discussion, and I noticed that the steps I had suggested either did not correspond with his intentions, or that he regarded them as impracticable.
I regarded the tension with England as a decided mistake. Germany was a power in the ascendant, and developed more and more economically, and it was therefore intelligible and only a natural, instinctive desire on the part of Germany to make her power felt upon the sea and to emancipate herself entirely from England. But at the same time this effort was a bad speculation. It could not be expected that the German Navy would rival the British in size and power, or even exceed the proportion of power accepted by England. The only thing that could happen was that England would increase her own shipbuilding activities extensively through Germany's competitive efforts. It was quite impossible that England should give up her
