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OUR POLITICAL MISTAKES
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her intentions and it would have become known publicly that England refused to draw her sword either in defence of Belgium or in defence of international law.

When I told Bethmann-Hollweg my point of view during the war, he told me that he had not been in a position to undertake this step, because the military command did not permit the slightest delay but had urged an instant offensive in the interests of success. I failed to see this, as no serious loss of time was to be anticipated. Lengthy discussion need not have been entertained, as England had only to say yes or no. The agreement made between Bismarck and Gladstone was ready on the table; it was only necessary to accept or refuse it.

It is, of course, true that the offensive against France very nearly realized the success that was expected of it when the Battle of the Marne frustrated all our hopes and nothing remained out of the whole combination except the blame.

I also did not consider the manner in which the Serbian question w«s brought up to be a fortunate one. The latest Austrian Red Book shows that two points of view existed which were opposed to each other. One opinion was that war was to be commenced immediately, and so as to effect a surprise; the other opinion was expressed in the desire that a peaceable solution should be found bv making difficult but nevertheless acceptable conditions, and that war should not be declared unless these conditions