to carry out its programme, provided it contained a national element. The Hungarian people regarded their constitution as worthless. The King had no trust in his Government, and the Government had the feeling that it could look for no support from him. The King visited his Hungarian capital less and less. His old confidants disappeared one after another. The personal ties which had linked the King to Hungarian society became loosened. The idea which in its creation had given rise to so many fair hopes fell to the ground.
During this long crisis I often had the opportunity of appearing before the old King. As one of the leaders of the Opposition, I negotiated between the King and the Opposition.
In the beginning, when the military question began to occupy the forefront, I was strongly in favour of not forcing the language question in the army as a party question, but that the Government on its own initiative should tend towards this end, so that the spirit of the army should undergo a change, and that the majority of the officers should be drawn from Hungary and that Hungarian patriotism should be given a place in the army in accordance with its deserts. If this had been done, it might have been possible to avoid the disastrous fight which broke out later. However, nothing was done.
When I saw that the natural demand for a national army was developing into political determination and could not be obviated, I used the whole of my power
