however, that as soon as these questions were raised, without guarantees for the German element and the Hungarian states, there would be a desire for secession in Austria. I was certain, moreover, that the idea of an administrative union would gain support in Hungary and that the army would be disbanded. I also considered it probable that it would be impossible to satisfy the Slavs when the new organization took place, and that they would not bind themselves before they knew what was to be understood by the elastic principles of Wilson.
The object of the reorganization was the satisfaction of the non-Hungarian and non-German nationalities. Wilson was to be convinced by means of a fait accompli that there was a determination to adapt the situation to his principles. The effect of this step, however, had to be that the bitter feeling between the Germans and the Hungarians was raised to the highest pitch without being able to ensure that the other nations would be prepared to favour a programme as opposed to the proposal which promised them more, made by Wilson. It was not difficult to anticipate that, if we determined to reorganize the Monarchy upon a new basis at the time of our defeat, the Monarchy would inevitably collapse before we were able to sit down with a view to beginning negotiations. In order that no one else should annihilate us, we determined upon suicide. Before my journey to Switzerland I discussed this question fully with the King, and advised him to leave the constitutional form
