frontiers successfully and to whom we owed so much gratitude. I was also opposed to the idea of transferring the power to Karolyi and his party from the point of view of internal politics, because I was afraid that demagogy would obtain the upper hand and that a revolution would be brought about which would really have been the product of the Government. One of my friends prophesied with sound calculation that, as soon as Karolyi was in a sufficiently powerful position, he would dethrone the King and all his followers by telephone.
During these negotiations I expressed the opinion to Jászi and Kunfi that, if their party gained power, it would inevitably lead to anti-Semitism and a pogrom, for the Government would have such a predominantly Jewish character that the people of Hungary would not accept it. It was our duty to introduce the Hungarian nation to such a policy as was demanded by the new European situation, and not to place a few radical supporters of a small côterie at the head of affairs under pretext of the European situation and to govern Hungary without the participation of her national politicians.
There remained a third solution. This possibility was to form a new Government with Karolyi and his supporters, with the Social Democrats and with the various nationalities, as well as those national elements who recognized that a new tendency and a new policy was demanded by the new situation. The common programme had to be as follows: quick peace, and
