peace—even if this peace was unfavourable. With regard to the future, it was in Germany's interest that the Monarchy should save itself and approach the Entente in order to be able to negotiate between Germany and the Entente later on. The old alliance could not be maintained anyhow, as in this event the Entente would have been forced to co-operate with a view to frustrating the enemy alliance by all means in their power. If we decided upon separating from each other and determined upon new paths, there was a possibility that we might secure conditions by means of which our existence could still be secured. And if too severe conditions had been imposed upon us after we had given up the alliance which was dangerous to the Entente, and after we had made it clear that we did not intend to continue our old policy, then the peace-loving and ultimately just verdict of the public opinion of the world would have condemned these conditions, which in turn would have weakened the Entente and strengthened us. Moreover, there was more at stake for us than for the Germans. It was impossible to destroy the Germans, even by the severest peace, and the German plenipotentiaries said truly during the armistice negotiations: "A people of seventy millions can suffer, but it cannot die." We, on the other hand, were not in a position to make a similar assertion. Austria, and especially Hungary, stood on the verge of destruction. We had risked our existence, but the Germans had only risked their position.
My main motive, however, was that the revolution
