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DIPLOMACY AND THE WAR

had become so keen as to render a war between them possible. The opposition between Germany's Turco-phile policy and the outlook of England was all the more apparent because England began to turn her political forces against Turkey. Owing to the agitation of Gladstone in connection with the Armenian massacres, English democracy was animated by considerable antagonism towards the Turks. The whole of the prevalent Turkish system was disliked by England, and Abdul Hamid was hated intensely. This antipathy had been counteracted in earlier days by Britain's anxiety lest, in the event of Turkish rule passing away, Russia would control Constantinople. But for the time being that possibility seemed to have lost its terror. Since Cyprus (1878), Egypt (1892) and the Sudan (1898–99) had been brought under English influence by Beaconsfield, Gladstone and Salisbury respectively, the result on India of the fate of Constantinople was not considered to be of the same importance as heretofore. It was regarded as much more dangerous that Turkey should be supported by Germany than that Russia should become the protector of Constantinople.

In this way it came about that in all those questions relating to the Balkans and the Near East which had acquired an international character, England and Germany were in opposite camps. Salisbury took the part of the Armenians and the Greeks, and the German Chancellor, von Bülow, took sides with the Turks (1897). Public opinion in England took a very serious view of a speech which the Kaiser delivered in Asia,