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accept the Coburgs in spite of the fact that she had despised them in the beginning. Finally it became evident that the advantages which Russia had anticipated in the Balkans were relatively small compared with the advantages which Russia was able to secure for herself, economically and territorially, in Asia. In view of these considerations, Russia made every effort to subjugate the Far East.

Russia's efforts in this direction were frustrated, however, by the Japanese and by the influence of Great Britain. The reaction set in. Just as the failure of the Balkan policy had prepared the activity in Asia, so did the absence of success in Asia and the victories of Ojama and Toto facilitate the policy of Hartwig with its Serbophile tendency. The Czarist régime could, nevertheless, not endure inaction. Russia felt that continual interruption of her aggrandizement, which had not been impeded for hundreds of years, was dangerous to the Czarist prestige and might cause their downfall. Therefore the failure of one policy only bred the thought of further aggression; and for this reason an active policy in the Balkans was substituted for Asiatic activity. This Russian tendency was strengthened, moreover, by the anti-German policy of England. Consequently, Russia succeeded, in 1907 and 1908, in gaining a certain freedom of action in Europe soon after she had been met by an impenetrable obstacle in Asia.

The tension between Russia and ourselves was thrown into bolder relief because, just as Russia was