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44

DIPLOMACY AND THE WAR

Republic, was able to crystallize his policy in the following words: "Le Maroc pour la France ou le conflit." The Entente took the aggressive policy of Serbia under her wing, although she did not possess any important local interests. The Entente forgot, however, that it was really obvious that they were anxious, in both questions, to take a prominent part in determining international policy in order to show that their chief consideration was, after all, the safeguarding of peace.

The consequences of the Balkan crises were even more harmful than those of the African problem, because it had been found possible to eliminate the mutual opposition in Morocco completely (1911), whereas this was not the case in the Balkans. The opposition of the Balkans, on the other hand, was such as might lead, even without the wish of the Great Powers, to war, as in the case of the Pan-Serbian ideal.

The victories gained by Belgrade had increased her courage, and she now strove after the realization of her national programme. Having succeeded in achieving her object in Macedonia, and having conquered Bulgaria as well as weakened Turkey, Belgrade prepared the Irridenta in Austria and in Hungary. An attempt was made to undermine our security within our own territory, with the object of creating a state of revolution so as to throw the Austro-Hungarian question into relief, and thereby prepare for war. Russia observed these proceedings with satisfaction and carefully ensured