the Serbian danger, but their chief fault lay in the fact that they had ceased to have an individual will in European affairs.
The Government pursued a Balkan policy, whereas the Serbian question could only be settled amicably provided an approach to European policy was made. The Serbian danger was a result of the European tension, and it could only be allayed without bloodshed by solving the main problem simultaneously.
Berchtold counted on having to settle with Serbia by force of arms as early as 1913. He was prevented from putting his conviction into practice by Italy's declaration that she would not support us in such an event. Just at the time that the unfortunate assassination occurred in Serajevo, Berchtold tried to paralyse the Serbian danger by altering the balance of power in the Balkans. A memorandum which was published recently, and written before the murder at Serajevo, shows that it had been intended to gain Bulgarian sympathy for this purpose, and to define Roumania's position, which was admirable in intention but not quite sufficient. The essence of the question lay in the improvement of our relation to the Entente.
Attempts were made in this direction, but not with sufficient determination. England and Germany succeeded in reaching agreements with regard to single questions. The question of the Portuguese Colonies was solved in 1913–1914; the problem of the Bagdad Railway was the subject of an agreement in 1914; but these agreements did not by any means solve those
