Page:Diplomacy and the War (Andrassy 1921).djvu/79

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procedure encouraged Germany's enemies so much that the idea of revenge became stronger in France and it facilitated the bloody game that Russia played with Serbia. But I am unaware of any statement made by a responsible British statesman which in any way indicates belligerent intentions.

In fact, one has to recognize that English policy took great pains to avoid the acceptance of any responsibility and as long as she did not risk the friendship of France, England acted in the interests of peace.

During the last conflict in Morocco, Grey adopted an attitude which did not calm the anxiety of the French President, Caillaux, sufficiently for him to dare to count with certainty upon the military support of England, and he therefore became very cautious.

During the period of the Balkan War, Poincaré was of the opinion that England would support Russia in case of war by diplomatic means, which, Poincaré added, did not necessarily preclude the possibility that England would go a step further. In the report which has been mentioned previously concerning the French readiness for action. Count Benckendorf emphasized the fact that the French Ambassador, Cambon, relied upon the assistance of England and trusted that feelings of honour or the consciousness of her national pride would press the sword into the hand of Great Britain. At the same time he laid stress on the fact that the British Government and public opinion wanted peace and were trying to effect a compromise. Although he was of opinion that England might well appear upon