During the Moroccan crisis, it was not so much the nature of the German attitude, but the way in which it was expressed, that offended British vanity. The personal appearance of the Kaiser in the harbour and the despatch of a man-of-war to Agadir, reacted upon public opinion in England like an insult.
If I now summarize now investigation up to date, after all that I have said, I arrive at the following conclusions:
The tension, the danger of war and the distrust were so enormous and so constant in Europe, that Russia pursued the dangerous policy of associating herself with pan-Serbian ideas and fostering them secretly—a procedure which was suffered consciously by the Great Powers of the West.
The passionate feeling which had thus been created then became uncontrollable and culminated in the atrocity of Serajevo.
This tragedy forced us to settle with the Serbian danger, and we were met by a Russian attitude which condemned the murder and was consequently prepared to permit the humiliation of Serbia to a certain extent, but which refused to allow a weakening of Serbian aggressive power, which alone could have assured internal and external security. Russia also needed the alliance and the strength of Serbia for the future. France supported Russia, and England supported France, which was the natural consequence of the general policy of these States and the result of the fear of German supremacy.
