agreeable, but never touched on the question of Morocco. It is found convenient to assume that the Emperor William's visit to Tangier was a demonstration of personal initiative, and that accordingly at Berlin they are awaiting His Majesty's return to regulate its consequences.
I am told that the idea of calling a conference to carry on and complete the work of the Madrid Conference of 1880 has been abandoned because none of the Powers wanted it, and that the Sultan of Morocco can hardly be expected to take the initiative in such a proposal.
It is maintained in Government circles that the Franco-English and Franco-Spanish conventions have not involved any departure from the spirit of the Madrid convention, that ample explanations have been given on this matter, and that the action of France in Morocco, which is supported by England, Spain and Italy, is on a perfectly correct basis,[1] whereas Germany's attitude can only be based on fears and suspicions which have no grounds of excuse and which are injurious to France.
Although all the party leaders feel themselves under the circumstances bound for the time being to support M. Delcassé's foreign policy, yet this does not mean that they approve of it. Indeed a good many of them had warned him that he had better keep off this question, which is one that has been under observation for a long time past and whose danger has always been appreciated.
M. Delcassé thought that the agreement with England had dispelled these dangers, and that the moment was ripe for extending French influence in this part of Africa. He is now told that England's attitude was misleading, and that the immediate proof of this is the agreement that she has forced on with Spain. As a matter of fact it is known that the secret clauses of this agreement give Spain special advantages for the organisation of finance and currency; and that the distribution of spheres of influence ultimately contemplated will exclude France from Tangier and from the most important part of the coast.[2].
The Franco-Spanish agreement was presented to the Powers by the two countries concerned as being a corollary to the Anglo-French agreement. Germany therefore could not be ignorant of it provisions, and the attitude which she has subsequently adopted can only be founded on political considerations of a general nature, or else in the fear that the negotiations begun at Fez
- ↑ This would naturally be the view which official circles in Paris desired to impress upon the diplomatic representatives of neutral Powers. The published Conventions of 1904 did not involve a departure from the Madrid Convention (1880), which made of Morocco an international concern. But the Secret Agreements did, for they treated Morocco as a country whose future could be determined according to the ole interests of three Powers: in other words, they converted an international problem into a national one, and sought to solve it in accordance with the nationalistic interests of the three contracting Powers without any reference to the other signatory Powers of the Madrid Convention.
- ↑ This was true but unknown, of course, to the French public. It was the object of British diplomacy to prevent France from acquiring, under the partition scheme, the Mediterranean coast line of Morocco, which British diplomatic and strategic interests required should not fall into the hands of a first class naval Power.
