BOOK I. XXII. 18-XXIII. 5
will come along, and then he will shake his head and say, "Listen to me, my son; one ought of course to philosophize, but one ought also to keep one's head; this is all nonsense. You learn a syllogism from the philosophers, but you know better than the philosophers what you ought to do." 20Man, why, then, do you censure me, if I know? What shall I say to this slave? If I hold my peace, the fellow bursts with indignation. So I must say, "Forgive me as you would lovers; I am not my own master; I am mad."
CHAPTER XXIII
In answer to Epicurus
Even Epicurus understands that we are by nature social beings, but having once set our good in the husk which we wear, he cannot go on and say anything inconsistent with this. For, he next insists emphatically upon the principle that we ought neither to admire nor to accept anything that is detached from the nature of the good; and he is right in so doing. But how, then, can we still be social beings, if affection for our own children is not a natural sentiment? Why do you dissuade the wise man from bringing up children? Why are you afraid that sorrow will come to him on their account? What, does sorrow come to him on account of his house-slave Mouse?[1] Well, what does it matter to him if his little Mouse in his home begins to cry? 5Nay he knows, that if once a child is born,
- ↑ The reference here is clearly to Mys ("Mouse"), a favourite slave of Epicurus, who was brought up in his house, and took an active part in his philosophical studies, as Bentley saw (cf. Trans. Amer. Philol. Assoc., LII., 451). There is no evidence to support the common explanation that Epicurus had compared children to mice.
