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I shall now proceed to the observations I have to offer on this important subject; and I pledge myself that they shall be neither numerous nor diffusive.
In my apprehension, a constitution embraces two distinct parts or objects, the Principle and the Practice; and it is not only an essential, but an indispensable provision, that the practice should emanate from, and accord with the principle. Now I maintain, that the converse of this proposition is the case in the Constitution under discussion. The first article, for instance, of the Political State of Citizens (v. Title II. of the Constitution) says,
"Every man born and resident in France, who, being twenty-one years of age, has inscribed his name on the Civic Register of his Canton, and who has lived afterwards one year on the territory of the Republic, and who pays any direct contribution whatsoever, real or personal, is a French citizen."
I might here ask, if those only who come under the above description are to be considered as citizens, what designation do you mean to give the rest of the people? I allude to that portion of the people on whom the principal part of the labour falls, and on whom the weight of indirect taxation will in the event chiefly press. In the structure of the social fabric, this class of people are infinitely superior to that privileged order, whose only qualification is their wealth or territorial possessions. For what is trade without merchants? What is land without cultivation? And what is the produce of the land without manufacturers? But to return to the subject.
In the first place, this article is incompatible with the three first articles of the Declaration of Rights, which precede the Constitutional Act.
The first article of the Declaration of Rights says—
"The end of society is the public good; and the institution of government is to secure to every individual the enjoyment of his rights."
