Opinion of the Court
treated in a humane and sanitary manner, Akron, 462 U. S., at 451-452.
Justice White complained that the Court was engaging in "unrestrained imposition of its own extraconstitutional value preferences." Thornburgh, 476 U. S., at 794 (White, J., dissenting). And the United States as amicus curiae asked the Court to overrule Roe five times in the decade before Planned Parenthood v. Casey, see 505 U. S., at 844 (plurality opinion), and then asked the Court to overrule it once more in Casey itself.
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When Casey revisited Roe almost 20 years later, very little of Roe's reasoning was defended or preserved. The Court abandoned any reliance on a privacy right and instead grounded the abortion right entirely on the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. 505 U.S., at 846. The Court did not reaffirm Roe's erroneous account of abortion history. In fact, none of the Justices in the majority said anything about the history of the abortion right. And as for precedent, the Court relied on essentially the same body of cases that Roe had cited. Thus, with respect to the standard grounds for constitutional decisionmaking—text, history, and precedent—Casey did not attempt to bolster Roe's reasoning.
The Court also made no real effort to remedy one of the greatest weaknesses in Roe's analysis—its much-criticized discussion of viability. The Court retained what it called Roe's "central holding"—that a State may not regulate pre-viability abortions for the purpose of protecting fetal life—but it provided no principled defense of the viability line. Id., at 860, 870–871. Instead, it merely rephrased what Roe had said, stating that viability marked the point at which "the independent existence of a second life can in reason and fairness be the object of state protection that now overrides the rights of the woman." Id., at 870. Why "reason
