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Extreme Right-Wing Terrorism

188. The OIR also listed nine specific recommendations regarding measures to be taken with regard to adopting a new approach to Domestic Extremism—these are listed below:

Operational Improvement Review (OIR)—Recommendations[1]
9.1 The Home Office should consider whether the ICT and 'Domestic Extremism' labels are still fit for purpose and if not, in consultation with the CT community, should develop new ones.
9.2 JTAC should be responsible for the production of national Threat Assessments of terrorist threats arising from Domestic Extremism work, employing common language, methodology and approach to that already used for Islamist extremist threats. In order for JTAC to undertake this role, it would require additional resources, a clear policy framework and mechanisms for insight into relevant Police and MI5 investigations. The respective roles for JTAC, the Police and other partners, should be clarified in order to ensure a comprehensive understanding of the threat, reflecting current arrangements for ICT/Islamist extremism.
9.3 CTP and MI5 should also agree a formal process for greater MI5 involvement in the assessment of Red-graded IHM [Intelligence Handling Model] leads, and DE PLA [UK] and PIB [Overseas] priority investigations.[2] A supporting formal governance structure should also be established to enable decisions to be made on primacy for the investigation of the highest level of Domestic Extremism cases, where a clear threat to national security is posed. This will allow greater MIS exposure to the most serious DE threats and allow more effective resolution of these threats.
9.4 MI5 should be engaged in decision-making and resource allocation in all investigations relating to proscribed organisations such as National Action.
9.5 MI5 and CTP to consider how to improve international intelligence flows on DE, through multilateral [international] fora.
9.6 MI5 support should continue for DE post-attack investigations where appropriate, with consideration as to provision of specialist support capabilities.
9.7 CT policing to review existing post—DRR staffing formula and allocation within CT (D)US, with a view to re-establishing DE Thematic desks.
9.8 CTP and MI5 should review guidance to ensure consistency of process in application of IHM, recording of decisions and providing appropriate visibility of intelligence.
9.9 Consideration to be given to the resource impact on MI5 of accepting the above recommendations, as this would be new work.

L. The Operational Improvement Review and its practical recommendations signalled a fundamental shift in the Government's approach to what was then termed 'Domestic Extremism'—the subsequent transfer of lead responsibility from Counter Terrorism Policing to MI5 regarding what was by then recognised as a terrorist threat was a pragmatic and logical move.


  1. MI5 and CTP, Operational Improvement Review, October 2017 (Chapter 9—Domestic Extremism).
  2. The investigative process is covered in detail later in this Report.

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