£200,000 to the Egyptian treasury. At that moment it was in a state of open rebellion, stirred up by a religious fanatic who proclaimed himself a mahdi of Islam. An army of 10,000 men under an English officer, Colonel William Hicks, formerly of the Bombay army, otherwise Hicks Pasha, had been sent to suppress the revolt, and had been annihilated in a great battle fought on the 5th of November 1883, near Obeid. The Egyptian government wished to make a new attempt to recover the lost province, and the idea was certainly very popular among the governing class, but Sir Evelyn Baring vetoed the project on the ground that Egypt had neither soldiers nor money to carry it out. In vain the khedive and his prime minister, Sherif Pasha, threatened to resign, and the latter actually carried out his threat. The British representative remained firm, and it was decided that the Sudan should be, for the moment at least, abandoned to its fate. Nubar, though as strongly opposed to the abandonment policy as Sherif, consented to take his place and accepted somewhat reluctantly the new régime, which he defined as “the administration of Egypt under the government of Baring.” By this time the Mahdi was master of the greater part of the Sudan, but Khartum and some other fortified points still held out. The efforts made to extricate the garrisons, including the mission of General Gordon, the fall of Khartum, and the Nile Expedition under Lord Wolseley, are described below separately in the section of this article dealing with the military operations. The practical result was that the khedive’s authority was limited to the Nile valley north of Wadi Halfa.
With the internal difficulties Sir Evelyn Baring had been struggling bravely ever since his appointment, trying to evolve out of the ever-changing policy and contradictory orders of the British government some sort of coherent Internal reorganization. line of action, and to raise the administration to a higher standard. For two or three years it seemed doubtful whether he would succeed. All over Egypt there was a feeling of unrest, and the well-meant but not very successful efforts of the British to improve the state of things were making them very unpopular. The introduction of English officials and English influence into all the administrative departments was resented by the native officials, and the action of the irrigation officers in preventing the customary abuses of the distribution of water was resented by the great landowners, who had been, from time immemorial, in the habit of taking as much as they wanted, to the detriment of the fellahin. Even these latter, who gained most by the reforms, considered that they had good reason to complain, for the defeat of Arabi and the re-establishment of order had enabled the Christian money-lenders to return and insist on the payment of claims, which were supposed to have been extinguished by the rebellion. Worst of all, the government was drifting rapidly towards insolvency, being quite unable to fulfil its obligations to the bondholders and meet the expenses of administration. All departments were being starved, and even the salaries of poorly paid officials were in arrear. To free itself from its financial difficulties the government adopted a heroic remedy which only created fresh troubles. On the advice of Lord Northbrook, who was sent out to Cairo in September 1884 to examine the financial situation, certain revenues which should have been paid into the Caisse for the benefit of the bondholders were paid into the treasury for the ordinary needs of the administration. Immediately the powers protested against this infraction of the law of liquidation, and the Caisse applied for a writ to the Mixed Tribunals. In this way the heroic remedy failed, and to the internal difficulties were added international complications.
Fortunately for Egypt, the British government contrived to solve the international difficulty by timely concessions to the powers, and succeeded in negotiating the London Convention of March 1885, by which the Egyptian government was relieved from some of the most onerous stipulations of the law of liquidation, and was enabled to raise a loan of £9,000,000 for an annual payment of £135,000. After paying out of the capital the sums required for the indemnities due for the burning of Alexandria and the deficits of the years 1882 and 1883, it still had a million sterling, and boldly invested it in the improvement of irrigation. The investment proved most remunerative, and helped very materially to save the country from bankruptcy and internationalism. The danger of being again subjected to the evils of an international administration was very great, for the London Convention contained a stipulation to the effect that if Egypt could not pay her way at the end of two years, another international commission would be appointed.
To obviate this catastrophe the British reformers set to work most energetically. Already something in the way of retrenchment and reform had been accomplished. The public accounts had been put in order, and the abuses in the collection of the land tax removed. The constant drain of money and men for the Sudan had been stopped. A beginning had been made for creating a new army to replace the one that had been disbanded and to allow of a portion of the British garrison being withdrawn. In this work Sir Evelyn Wood had shown much sound judgment as well as great capacity for military organization, and had formed an efficient force out of very unpromising material (see the section above on the Egyptian Army). His colleague in the department of public works, Sir Colin Scott-Moncrieff, had been not less active. By mitigating the hardships of the corvée, and improving the irrigation system, on which the prosperity of the country mainly depends, he had conferred enormous benefits on the fellahin, and had laid the foundation of permanent budgetary equilibrium for the future. Not less active was Sir Edgar Vincent, the financial adviser, who kept a firm hold on the purse-strings and ruthlessly cut down expenditure in all departments except that of irrigation (see § Finance).
The activity of the British officials naturally produced a certain amount of discontent and resistance on the part of their Egyptian colleagues, and Lord Granville was obliged to declare very plainly that such resistance could not be tolerated. Writing (January 1884) to Sir Evelyn Baring, he said:
“It should be made clear to the Egyptian Ministers and Governors of Provinces that the responsibility which for the time rests on England obliges H.M. Government to insist on the adoption of the policy which they recommend; and that it will be necessary that those Ministers and Governors who do not follow this course should cease to hold their offices.”
Nubar Pasha, who continued to be prime minister, resisted occasionally. What he chiefly objected to was direct interference in the provincial administration and the native tribunals, and he succeeded for a time in Relations between British and native officials. preventing such interference. Sir Benson Maxwell and Mr Clifford Lloyd, who had been sent out to reform the departments of justice and the interior, after coming into conflict with each other were both recalled, and the reforming activity was for a time restricted to the departments of war, public works and finance. Gradually the tension between natives and foreigners relaxed, and mutual confidence was established. Experience had evolved the working principle which was officially formulated at a much later period: “Our task is not to rule the Egyptians, but as far as possible to teach the Egyptians to rule themselves.... European initiative suggests measures to be executed by Egyptian agency, while European supervision controls the manner in which they are executed.” If that principle had been firmly laid down and clearly understood at the beginning, a good deal of needless friction would have been avoided.
The international difficulty remained. The British position in Egypt was anomalous, and might easily give rise to international complications. The sultan might well protest against the military occupation of a portion of his International problems. empire by foreign troops. It was no secret that France was ready to give him diplomatic support, and other powers might adopt a similar attitude. Besides this, the British government was anxious to terminate the occupation as soon as possible. With a view to regularizing the situation and accelerating the evacuation, Sir Henry Drummond Wolff was sent to Constantinople in August 1885 on a special mission. On the 24th of October of that year he concluded a preliminary
